INTRODUCTION:
PRISONS, IMAGES OF CONFINEMENT AND THE CARCERAL IMAGINARY

Afloat you are as free as the weather allows you to be; you are surrounded by nature; and you are (forgetting the crew) as solitary as you need and want to be. Ashore is where the problems start, because ashore is full of other people. [...] 'We don't know anything, can't see anything, we're shut up, imprisoned inside ourselves [...]' Like Flaubert, Maupassant hates people en masse [...]. (Barnes 2009: 26)1

Imprisonment (at least metaphorical imprisonment) is a fairly familiar experience. We all at particular times feel confined in some situations or relationships. But why write about it, my friends have been asking me for years. What makes the subject so fascinating and so important both theoretically and emotionally? Although 9/11 and its aftermath gave a distinct boost to the topic, prisons had cropped up in my reading before that time and had already launched me on a voyage of discovery.

It all started with my research into Middle English narrative structure and my analysis of the saints' lives, the Katherine Group from the late twelfth century, the popular tales collected by Carl Horstmann from around the same period up until the early thirteenth century, the Early South English Legendary and the South English Legendary proper, on to the Northern Homily Cycle and the Scottish Legendary. Saints in hagiography progressed along a recognizable route: confrontation with the pagan secular powers, imprisonment alternating with scenes of interrogation and torture, and eventual martyrdom, mostly through beheading. In some of these legends, the prison scenes are quite important. Often the saint (e.g. St. Katherine) is solaced and fed by angels and cured of her/his wounds; at other times, the dungeon cell becomes the site of conversion, as in St. Margaret's story, where the saint manages to make both the emperor's wife and the king's trusty councillor convert to Christianity (upon which they are both martyred). In St. Margaret's legend, the prison cell even provides the backdrop for the sensational battle between the saint and the devil in the shape of a dragon – variously portrayed by painters. (See Figure 0.1.)

1 All emphases in bold italics are mine.
Figure 0.1 The Hague, MMW_10F1, fol. 214v, suffrage (Bruges, ca. 1490). "St. Margaret of Antioch emerging from the dragon & holding a cross". Historiated initial. National Library of the Netherlands. Book of Hours (use of Rome).
Besides a couple of paintings that show Margaret standing over the dragon in open space, with the prison represented as a dungeon tower in the background (e.g. "St. Margaret of Antioch" from the fifteenth-century Use of Sarum Book of Hours)\(^2\) or standing free without any representational space around her (e.g. in a painting by Felice Riccio or Brusasorci [1542-1605] or in one by Antoine Auguste Ernest Herbert [1817-1918], "Saint Margaret Slaying the Dragon"\(^3\)), most of the paintings featuring St. Margaret depict the saint in her dungeon. However, that dungeon looks very different in the various canvasses. Many panels merely hint at the prison, or stylize it\(^4\); some give us neoclassical-style architecture which is clearly inappropriate as a historical representation of third-century prisons.\(^5\) A much more convincing representation can be found in MMW_10F1, Bruges, 1490 (Figure 0.1) where the narrowness of the prison cell and its one window shedding light on the saint present a more 'realistic' perspective on imprisonment, though again the symbolism of the light falling on the saint’s raised cross is importantly stylized. Obviously, the saints themselves in their flowing garments cannot be taken as either realistic or historically accurate images. Figure 0.1 at least renders a scenario that is recognizably medieval even if stylized. Other painters, like Moreau, for instance, are inspired by sublime carceral spaces.\(^6\)

The imprisonment of saints fulfils a theological function in a typological reading of the saint's story. The saint's life mirrors that of Christ, who was himself imprisoned, if only briefly, and whose narrative in the Gospels traces a similar path of confrontation with the secular authorities: arrest – interrogation – imprisonment – scourging (equivalent to the tortures suffered by martyrs) – execution. The martyr in his or her suffering re-enacts the passion of Christ and therefore imitates and reproduces that divine model:

Interpreting the prison as a place and imprisonment as an experience was part of the Judeo-Christian tradition, whose scriptures abound with prisoners and prison scenes: from Joseph's captivity, to the incarcerations of the prophets Hanani, Michaiah, and

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\(^5\) This is true of The Hague, MMW_10F17, fol. 104r (France, central part, ca. 1490), where the prison looks like a room in a palace, though with barred windows. Rhimed Life of St. Margaret. "St. Margaret of Antioch emerging from the dragon & holding a cross". National Library of the Netherlands. Book of Hours (use of Rheims).

Jeremiah, to the prison execution of John the Baptist and the appearance of angels before the jailed apostles. (Geltner 2008: 83)

Analogously, the saint's narrative provides a model for the auditors' lives as journeys towards God and salvation, and therefore implies that not only could the listeners become martyrs in their turn, but also that in their normal lives people might travel down a similar road in their search for spiritual enlightenment. Thus, the literal imprisonment of Christ or that of the martyrs in the legendaries metaphorically comes to stand for the 'imprisonment' of the believer in this world, his or her fight against sin and his/her eventual conquest over it at death: "The martyrlogical literature conveying the experiences of Christian confessors presents the prison as a place of personal trial and eschatological triumph, and incarceration as a process of spiritual growth, potentially culminating in revelation" (Geltner 84). Based on Platonic ideas (compare 1.5.1 below), the notion of imprisonment in this world and of the soul in the body expanded over time and was significantly elaborated. It affected a wide range of medieval contexts such as rites performed on the entry of nuns into convents or anchoresses into their cells, rites that underlined the parallels between religious self-confinement and death. My initial contact with the topic of imprisonment therefore already combined literal and metaphorical confinement in various interesting constellations.

A second source of inspiration lay in the literature of the British Renaissance and Reformation, where one could encounter real saints and their imprisonment and often martyrdom. Early on, I became very interested in Sir Thomas More and in the religious issues surrounding the British Catholic and Protestant saints. (See below under 2.3 and 2.4.) Increasingly, this sparked my interest in the historical background and led to a fascination with prison conditions not only in the Renaissance and eighteenth century, but also in present times. It was in this comparison between literary depictions of imprisonment and contemporary penal practice that the germ of the present book originated.

My original plans for a book on the prison in English literature touched on three questions or theses. The focus was on the representation of the prison, and the first issue concerned the comparison between 'real' conditions of imprisonment and those depicted in the

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7 See Mulder-Bakker (2005: 69-70, 230-1 fn 79) as well as Clay (1914/1968), Warren (1980, 1984: 203-4, 1985), Schulenburg (1984), Bauerschmidt (1999: 78) and Wogan-Browne (2001). See also the following text from http://www.medieval-life-and-times.info/medieval-religion/anchoress.htm: "The incarceration of an anchoress was accompanied with due ceremony. This was called the Enclosure ceremony in which an anchorite or anchoress, was incarcerated, or enclosed, in a cell. Her living entombment and ritual burial, was an act of binding her body and her material surroundings to the body of Christ. The Anchoress was essentially dead to the World. [...] Sometimes her grave would be made ready at the time of her enclosure and kept open in the cell as a 'memento mori'. In these instances there was a complete burial ceremony. The anchoress would be laid out on a funeral bier and given the last rites". Bauerschmidt mentions extreme unction and a reading of the mass for the dead. More generally, on the status of the prison in Christian iconography and on monastic and lay spirituality using incarceration as a penitential model see Geltner (2008: 84-6).
literary texts. My second question targeted the difference between autobiographical or historical accounts on the one hand and literary/fictional prison narratives on the other. In particular, I became interested in authors who had suffered confinement and then written about their prison experience both autobiographically and fictionally. This issue provided the first inspiration for Chapters 2 and 3 of this study. Finally, I also started to focus on prison metaphors and their truth value. Do prison metaphors provide a picture of carcerality that is different from that of the represented settings? Are the metaphors inspired by real-life prison conditions?

It was in the wake of these three lines of enquiry that my research began to veer towards prison metaphors. It emerged early on that literary prisons mostly did not reflect contemporary conditions of incarceration but often reproduced and elaborated on literary models current since antiquity. Only the more recent realistic texts sometimes depicted a recognizable extra-literary ‘reality’. A second insight concerned the comparative rarity of autobiographical and fictional texts by the same author, especially before the eighteenth century. This made the second question as little useful as the first in providing a major structuring principle for the book, although it clearly has left its mark on the volume. Even the third line of enquiry turned out to be a red herring. It emerged that prison metaphors were in no way significantly different from prison settings since the same carceral topoi and tropes that had characterized the depiction of prison spaces in literary texts were also found to dominate the choice of prison metaphors. However, in analyzing the various metaphors, it soon became apparent that these were even more fascinating than the settings and – more importantly – that they opened up entirely new perspectives on carcerality and its status in our culture. Better still, it also turned out that prison metaphors had received comparatively little attention in both literary and linguistic research and therefore offered me a huge unploughed field whose buried treasures were waiting to be excavated, analyzed and displayed to the reader.

From these beginnings, the present study took shape as a book that deals with the prevalence and functions of carceral images in our culture and their complex dependence, both materially and discursively, on ‘real life’. In particular, the book takes into account questions of ideology and discursive traditions while focusing on a number of key topoi and tropes that mediate between settings, metaphors and textual deployments.

In the following pages I want to introduce readers to several background issues and to the ruling theoretical paradigms that underpin my analyses in subsequent chapters. After an initial terminological exercise (What is confinement? What is freedom?) in section 0.1, I want to say something about the prison in its historical reality and outline my stance towards the Foucauldian framework (section 0.2). Subsequently, I specify in more detail what I mean by the term *topos* or *topoi* (section 0.3). Section 0.4 outlines some preliminary aspects of
carceral topography. Next I provide a delineation of metaphor theory and of my leading distinctions and theses in relation to it (section 0.5). Specifically, my approach to metaphor involves looking more closely at ideology and the carceral imaginary (section 0.6). This final section is devoted to the link between the factual and the imaginary, thus relating to the key concepts in the subtitle of the book: Fact, Fiction and Fantasy.

0.1 Confinement and Flight: Preliminaries

Echoing W.B. Carnochan's fine study of eighteenth-century literature, I would like to start by way of a systematic analysis of types of imprisonment and the question of escape from the real or metaphoric prison.8

Imprisonment is synonymous with several aspects of constraint and confinement that often occur in tandem. In characterizing imprisonment, it is therefore important to ask what exactly I mean by this lexeme and to what extent the literary carceral foregrounds or emphasizes some of these aspects over others. What we are dealing with in this book is imprisonment in a state-run facility (following legal arrest), which consists of being shut up for safekeeping and as punishment.9

The most basic semantic feature associated with confinement touches on the curtailment of autonomous physical movement; the subject is constrained from straying abroad by having his/her motor skills impaired, usually by tying him/her down, impeding physical movement.10 Although such binding or tying (by means of ropes, fetters, shackles, gyves, etc.) is a measure of restraint that may render a subject incapable of acting in self-defence or keep him/her from aggression, traditionally such bondage was crucial to imprisonment, i.e. to constraint, because it prevented the subject from running away and helped to keep him/her in a specific location. A captive will usually be bound, even if not imprisoned in a prison. This first category is therefore historically important, and it also underlines the cline between captivity and imprisonment.

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8 My special thanks go to the FRIAS (Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies) for a session of its Wednesday morning colloquium in the spring of 2010 at which I was allowed to present my work in progress. Some of the issues treated in this section were directly inspired by the discussion and comments on this occasion.

9 Lawn (1977: 7) cites a definition which foregrounds enclosure, safekeeping, forced legal arrest and deprivation of the basic human right to personal freedom: "Gefängnis, ursprünglich die abstrakte Gefangenschaft bezeichnend, ist konkret und rechtsbegrifflich ein umschlossener, gesicherter Raum, wo Personen auf Grund obrigkeitlicher Anordnung zwangsweise festgehalten und damit des Grundrechts der persönlichen Freiheit beraubt werden" (qtd. from Galling 1958: 1246). Since the term 'personal liberty' is rather vague, I am keen to establish what the most basic aspects of confinement are. English translation: 'Prison, originally in reference to abstract confinement, in material and legal terms, is a secured enclosed space in which persons are kept by force on the basis of authoritative orders and whose basic right to liberty is thereby infringed'.

10 In cognitive metaphor theory, this corresponds to the notion of "Blockage" (M. Johnson 1987: 45).
In terms of literary texts, constraint plays a huge role in the associations with the dungeon setting, in which imprisoned subjects are almost invariably depicted as chained; restraint also features prominently in many metaphors, where the lexemes tied, gyves, shackled or fettered figure with great frequency as source terms metonymically related to the dungeon scenario. This first semantic sub-category of confinement moreover acquires additional importance as a disciplinary measure even before the invention of the penitentiary, but especially in the new post-Benthamite prison regime. Whereas refractory prisoners could always be clapped in irons, gyving was also common as an additional punishment for particularly dangerous offenders or as a mark of the jailer's personal pique or displeasure. (The tyranny and cruelty of jailers is a theme that runs through prison literature.) In more enlightened carceral regimes, especially since the mid-nineteenth century, discipline is in principle regulated by a hearing of the offender before a review panel and then imposed as a disciplinary measure; however, these rules are not always observed, and in some countries restraints are still applied in a haphazard and indiscriminate manner.\footnote{See, for instance, USA. Hüter der Menschenrechte? (1998).}

Besides physical restraint (often superimposed on enclosure), there is, secondly, the most important aspect of imprisonment, that of the curtailment of freedom of movement by means of containment in enclosed space.\footnote{In cognitive metaphor theory, this corresponds to the notion of "Compulsion" (M. Johnson 1987: 45).} The subject in this case (if not fettered) could in principle run away, i.e. his/her limbs are left free, but is prevented from escape by an enclosure that cannot be breached. Most often the prison in which the captive finds him/herself is a cell, a room whose only exit is the door, which is locked. However, although gates of steel or iron bars are the norm, people can be locked up in closets by means of a simple door or – a medieval practice – lowered into well-like cavities that cannot be scaled from below (Lawn 1977: 127-8). Barred windows and doors, locks and keys tend to acquire symbolic significance as possible access or exit points from enclosure (see below in section 0.3).

Both the first and the second constituent of imprisonment curb the prisoner's physical locomotion, in the first case by curtailing physical movement of the limbs, in the second by keeping the captive within a small space and preventing relocation, especially escape from his/her captors. The common denominator here is deprivation of self-determined movement and action or the loss of independence. Besides losing their physical autonomy (moving where they want to) prisoners additionally become dependent on their captors because these decide what they can or cannot do. The third aspect of imprisonment is therefore that of the captive's subjection to the will of the jailer: the prisoner also loses his or her voli-
tional independence. Not only are the incarcerated hindered from moving elsewhere; they moreover find themselves severely circumscribed in everything they may do and consistently thwarted in acting as they would like. The jailer and the whole penal system in fact coerce the inmate to act in certain ways, and impose behaviours and routines on the prisoners. As Margaret Atwood puts it, "A prison might be defined as any place you've been put into against your will and can't get out of, and where you are entirely at the mercy of the authorities" (2015).

Whereas, before the invention of the penitentiary, offenders still had considerable freedom within prisons and jails, constrained more by carceral space than by imposed schedules, the penitentiary regime began to order the life of inmates in accordance with contemporary penal policies. Not only is an inmate normally unable to choose when to get up and when to eat, but also what to eat, when to shower, what to wear, when to take a walk, when to receive visitors, and so on. Whereas ordinary life is full of decisions each day (Shall I take the blue or the yellow cardigan? Should I go to the bank first and then to the cobbler or the other way around? Do I have a snack now and have my cutlet for dinner instead of lunch?), decisions on such personal preferences when ordering one's life are taken out of the hands of a prisoner, whose pockets of freedom to do as s/he pleases thereby shrink to minimal size: Do I keep my comb on top of the shelf or on the side of the washbasin? Shall I read the newspaper or a book before the light is switched off? Part of the debilitating influence of imprisonment on inmates (in criminology referred to as *prisonization* – Naderi 2014) stems precisely from this over-regimentation of their lives to the point where, on release, they are overwhelmed by the myriad choices they have to make. The institutional restructuring of prisoners' everyday routines undermines a particularly basic aspect of human agency, namely deliberate action. Natural behaviour consists in, say, seeing a radio in a shop, planning to save up for it, buying it, transporting it home and enjoying it. The human subject desires an object and (if at all possible) attains fulfilment of this desire. In bringing this goal-directed action to its completion, subjects act independently, and the mere possibility of engaging in activity that is geared towards the attainment of a goal therefore connotes freedom of action. Nearly all such freedom has been taken away from prisoners.

Another contributory factor to volitional curtailment consists in the abolishment of inmates' freedom of association – it is in the interest of authorities to isolate prisoners or severely restrict their communication with other offenders. Again, the penitentiary was the

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13 In cognitive metaphor theory, this corresponds to the notion of "Enablement" (M. Johnson 1987: 47).  
14 Goffman (1961: 61-4) describes the correlative process of institutionalization and discusses four "lines of adaptation" to subjective alienation in the total institutions he analyses: "situational withdrawal" (or regression); intransigence; "colonization" and "conversion".
founding model for associational deprivation under the aegis of combating corruption and moral depravity among inmates. However, the curtailment of association strikes at another basic human need, that for communication and self-assurance by making contact with others. (In Lacanian terms, the ego is only created by the eye of the other.) In extreme forms of penal isolation, the prisoner is therefore ultimately deprived of the freedom to be him/herself, to establish and maintain a personal identity.

The three aspects that characterize imprisonment discussed so far impinge on the prisoner in a passive manner: he or she is prevented from moving, relocating or following his/her wishes, making his/her choices or from communicating. The fourth and final aspect of penal incarceration that I wish to note, coercion, takes subjection to the will of the jailer or penal establishment a step further by not merely keeping the inmate from following his/her natural inclinations, but by forcing him/her to act against his/her wishes, by making him/her work, circle around the yard or walk in lockstep. The third and fourth aspects, like the first and second, are similarly co-dependent. The prisoner cannot sleep until 10 a.m. (volitional deprivation) and is made to get up at 5 a.m. and driven to work in the mines until after dark (coercion). Seeing that the penitentiary system was modelled both on the monastery (see 7.2 below) and on slavery (see 6.4.3 and 7.5.3), the combination of curtailing volition and regulating all actions of the captive subject down to the most minor movements inevitably morphs into coercion.15 While the other categories of dependence had foregrounded the thwarting of prisoners' exercise of freedom, this category is based on the deprivation of their right to say no, to refuse compliance, to prefer not to, in Bartleby's words.16 Category four therefore primarily relates to slavery, work camps, gulags and concentration camps, but owing to the systematic ingredient of forced labour in the penitentiary system, it also plays an important role in many modern prisons both real and fictional.

Having established the preceding four categories to describe what imprisonment may connote, we can now go on to characterize what freedom might mean in relation to them. The reader will have noted that my procedure has been the inverse of the more common order, namely that of defining imprisonment in relation to the various specific deprivations to which prisoners are subjected (deprivation of sex, of friendship, of positive human contact, especially with one's family, of full medical services, of cultural and educational material, adequate food and nutritional supply, personal comfort, regular hygiene as well as access to

15 On the prison as a coercive institution see also Patton (1979: 124) and Léonard (1980: 124).

16 For a superb reading of Herman Melville's "Bartleby" from a carceral perspective see Caleb Smith (2009: 65-72, 76-7).
the full range of consumer goods which most people nowadays take for granted). The four aspects which I have noted are, however, semantically more basic – most of the deprivations just listed relate to the prison regime typical of the penitentiary and do not focus on the core meanings of enclosure. I will refer to the long list of deprivations in several contexts in the book; at this point, however, I would like to specify what freedom might mean as the opposite of imprisonment conceived as a combination of the four factors: restraint of movement, containment, loss of autonomy and coercion. When the condition of carcerality is defined as a series of deprivations, freedom becomes a territory of limitless possibilities; and because most of the penal deprivations relate to the subjection of the inmate to the rules and regulations of the carceral regime, freedom therefore appears to be equivalent to doing what one wants when one wants to. In opting for the core meanings of imprisonment, I am trying to delineate what kinds of escapes there are from the subject’s entrapment. This is useful since in the texts that I will be dealing with, such avenues of hope and escape are variously envisaged and therefore metaphorically or literally textualized. Especially when one encounters prison metaphors of the X IS (A) PRISON type, the situation of metaphorical confinement that they refer to is often presented in terms of a possible escape, as in He wanted to break his bonds and decamp. The fact that marriage is so frequently perceived as a prison stems from one partner’s wish to rid him/her-self of the constraints that they labour under – the situation of entrapment is figured ex contrario through the hope of delivery.

17 John Rowan (1978: 36-7) provides a scale of “noxious stimuli” apt to cause aggressive behaviour; these, interestingly, offer an alternative analysis of penal harms. He lists four levels of increasing provocation: “NOXIOUS STIMULATION”, i.e. “direct physical punishment”; “RESOURCE DEPRIVATION” (“Punishment which imposes costs or fines upon the subject”); “DEPRIVATION OF EXPECTED GAIN” (which “can produce very strong reactions”); and “SOCIAL INJURY” (i.e. “Punishment which attacks the subject’s self-concept”).

A survey of several philosophical dictionaries and dictionary entries on the concept of freedom is also enlightening. Thus, the main philosophical understanding of freedom seems to consist in the subject’s power to exercise moral choice and to make decisions independently (OED s.v. freedom, category I 5); this self-determination is seen as a basic premise for any moral responsibility and action. Dictionary entries discussing the extensive collocations of the lexeme free(dom) focus on quite different aspects of the word. The most commonly noted first meaning, however, is that of (a) being at liberty in the sense of being free from constraint and/or confinement (in opposition to slavery or bondage – see OED I 1a); another relevant connotation concerns (b) the exemption from external control (“independence” OED I 3) and (c) the subject’s power to determine action without constraint (“liberty of action”; OED I 4a), as well as (d) “personal liberty”. (This last meaning (d) is often seen as equivalent to (a) above; cp., for instance, the definition in www.dictionary.reference.com, meaning 5. Note that the OED in (I 1a) does not distinguish clearly between freedom from imprisonment or slavery and freedom from physical restraint, two meanings also partly confused in www.dictionary.reference.com, meaning 1.). Besides these denotations, which we already encountered in our categorization above, there are quite a few meanings that are not relevant to our topic: (e) absence of ties or obligations (OED I 1c); (f) frankness of speech (OED I 8a); (g) exemption or immunity from, say, taxes (OED, II 13a); (h) the ability or privilege to do something (freedom to require students to pay; OED I 8b); (i) the ease or facility of movement or action (free gait; OED I 9). (There are quite a few more, but I’ll draw a line under the list here.) What is particularly interesting in the OED is the fact that this dictionary is the only one to prominently highlight the metaphorical meaning of freedom as the second (!) denotation in their list: “fig. Liberation from the bondage or dominating influence of sin, spiritual servitude, worldly ties, etc.” (I 1b).
In analogy with the four categories listed above (restraint, containment, loss of autonomy, coercion), freedom can be imagined, first, as a regaining of physical movement, a breaking of fetters or chains. This usually implies that an effort of strength or volition, a use of violence, may bring about the desired effect of liberation. In correlation with the second category, enclosure, the imagery is quite different. Here, freedom may be gained by means of scaling walls, digging holes or tunnels, or by flying away. We will encounter these traditional, often compensatory, illusionary and elusive visions of escape in many texts. Category three, subjection to the jailer’s will, is opposed to autonomous action, planning and decision making. Though some prisoners engage in making elaborate plans to escape, this otherwise so crucial freedom to do as one pleases takes up very little space in the imagery of imprisonment; even autobiographical texts focus more on the frustrations of not being able to read late at night or see one’s children. If textualized at all, such images usually occur in the context of dreams or plans for the time after release. Thematically, therefore, this category is not one type of freedom but a whole panoply of different actions which are desired but have no common denominator except that they all are forbidden or impossible to obtain in prison. Finally, as regards imprisonment as slavery, freedom again figures prominently as resistance to, or conquest over, the taskmaster who imposes the labour on the inmate. The fact that the jailer here figures so prominently also supports the existence of this fourth category as a separate item: ultimately, what is being foregrounded is the power struggle between inmate and jailer rather than the prisoner’s being deprived of various consumer goods or possibilities of agency: freedom equals freedom from the person who has the power to order one about.

Having noted the different types of freedom that emerge from the four core meanings of imprisonment, it may be appropriate to discuss what role freedom plays in this book. Unfortunately, in most of the texts discussed in this study the positive outcome of flight or escape is only rarely granted to the prisoner. With the exception of the criminal biography, or the prison film, sensational escapes are rare. Hope often centres on life after death, on the victory of the ideas that the incarcerated subject is suffering for. Many modern texts moreover display a pessimistic view of society as prison-like, a perspective that is usually conterminous with the impression of an entrapment with no exit. Despite some silver linings on a few horizons, the majority of literal and metaphorical prison scenarios in literature do not allow for much hope. By contrast, prison films teem with escapes and often have a happy ending; the sensational pattern of confinement and flight so common in the eighteenth-century texts discussed by Carnochan (1977) survives in the film, at least in the canonical prison movie (Rafter 2000, Becker 2001 Jarvis 2004, Alber 2007, Caster 2008).
0.2 *Prison – History and Theory: Beyond Foucault*

Since the work of Michel Foucault (1975/1979a), Michael Ignatieff (1978) and John Bender (1987) it has been a commonplace in studies of the prison to distinguish between an old prison – medieval in its setup, dark, unwholesome, gregarious – and the penitentiary – modern, clean and segregated.19

This fundamental dichotomy extends to cover a great many features in the two prototypes. The old prison merely served the purpose of keeping the accused and witnesses under custody until trial could take place at the assizes, and it also housed debtors and convicted felons before execution or transportation. By contrast, the penitentiary – in distinction to the local jail – shut up only the convicted criminal, and came to replace all punishments except the death penalty until that was abolished (though this has not happened everywhere). Whereas a large variety of minor punishments (the pillory, branding, whipping) were still current during the rise of the penitentiary, the new prison model came to impose a single type of penalty for all misdemeanours and crimes, varied merely by the length of confinement (and, to some extent, the severity of treatment). The traditional pre-eighteenth-century prison or jail, at least in Britain, was run by the sheriff or a comparable officer, who had bought the job like a military commission and was now trying to extract profit from it through fees, charging for housing, food, drink and other commodities.20 By contrast, the new prison eventually evolved into an entirely state-run affair with central rules, the supervision of governors and warders through government commissions, and a budget set aside by the current administration. (Private prisons as reintroduced in the United States and in Britain are therefore a return to the pre-1800 model.) As a consequence of the nationalization of prisons in the nineteenth century, formerly haphazard, disorderly and disease-ridden institutions were gradually transformed into orderly and sanitary facilities regulated by acts of parliament. As Foucault has shown in detail, one of the most striking differences between the old and the new prison concerned disciplining. In the old prison, discipline was at a minimum; inmates were free to do what they wanted inside the prison walls except at night. Most prisoners spent their unwanted leisure on gambling, drinking and in-prison criminality. By contrast, the penitentiary was designed as a disciplinary institution: inmates were to be set to work as an educational strategy, with the aim of transforming them into productive members of society.

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19 See also below under 1.1.

20 Curiously, as Gertrude Himmelfarb (1968/1995: 32-81) points out, even Jeremy Bentham still saw his panopticon precisely as a kind of profitable business venture. Compare further below.
(Foucault's analysis of the parallels with factories, the army and schools is extremely enlightening. See Chapter 7.)

Finally, not only were prisoners in the old system confined in promiscuous, dirty lodgings and kept in unregenerative boredom, they were often accompanied by their entire families and had extensive contact with the world outside prison walls. Prisons were well known to the general public since the presence of debtors inside these institutions meant that a large number of people, also from the middle and upper classes, came to experience confinement. Visiting prisoners was a national pastime that allowed a sizeable number of spectators to be party to the fate of the inmates. At the same time, some prisoners kept close contact with the outside world by running a shoe shop inside the prison, or by sending family members out to work to earn the wherewithal necessary to pay for the family's accommodation in the jail. The penitentiary, by contrast, not only segregated the prisoners individually inside the institution, housing them singly in cells, thus putting a stop to the moral 'contamination' between different classes of criminals inside prison walls; it moreover resolutely cut off all contact with the outside world. Henceforth, prisons turned into uncanny heterotopias, places of alterity (see below). Consequently, they are both excessively feared as places about which little is known and exotically transformed into sites of fantasy and projection. Whereas the old prison tended to be a counterworld (as hell and heaven are counterworlds to the earth), penitentiaries' dystopian design produced a nowhere (u-topia) outside society, a place of exile, a life in death that cut off inmates from nature, from their family bonds, from their entire known world, and transferred them to a non-world of sterile, abstract, inhuman space. The modern prison, from the perspective of those left behind outside (or in) society, is uncanny in the etymological sense of Freud's un-heimlich.

Foucault's dichotomy of the old and new prison therefore reflects incisive changes in penal conception and practice. It is a useful grand picture of historical discontinuity which helps to pinpoint key developments sparked by the invention of the penitentiary in the late eighteenth century. However, this binary opposition of antonymically related aspects (dark vs. light, filth vs. cleanliness, gregariousness vs. solitude, etc.) is not the whole truth. As has variously been pointed out, the features associated with the penitentiary were partially current in the various bridewells or tuchthuizen across Europe since the fifteenth century (Spierenburg 1995: 64-7). Conversely, the old prison continued to exist well into the middle of the nineteenth century, with local jails (McConville 1995) and debtors' prisons a permanent fixture of Victorian England. The rupture therefore was not as incisive as it may appear.

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21 For general surveys see Ignatieff (1978), Harding et al. (1985) and Morris/Rothmann (1995).
22 Geltner (2008: 7-8) points out that Gotthold Bohne in the 1920s already demonstrated the existence of penal incarceration in the Italian city-states from the mid-thirteenth century onwards.
at first sight, though clearly a complete transformation was achieved by the mid-nineteenth century. Foucault's study was, however, not primarily concerned with the history of the prison but with its enabling structure, the normalization effected through discipline (1979a: 183; see Patton 1979: 136 and Ransom 1997: 16), and with the purpose of the prison, identified as the production and management of "illegalities" (Foucault 1979a: 24, 89, 277-80; Patton 1979: 116, 127).

The prison is moreover a prototypical instance of Foucault's notion of the heterotopic (Foucault 1967/1984/1994). His conception of the prison as an other space, a space of otherness, will be particularly relevant to my discussion of THE PRISON AS WORLD topos in Chapter 1 below. In his analysis, the prison belongs to the heterotopias of deviance (to be distinguished from the heterotopias of crisis which resemble Victor Turner's liminal spaces). It also links interestingly with heterochrony, to the extent that inmates are placed not only out of space but out of time as a consequence of their lack of contact with the outside world. Furthermore, the penitentiary manipulates temporal experience. Unlike the heterochronies of the museum or library on the one hand and those of festivals and fairs on the other, where chronology is compressed or foregrounded as the same with a view towards overcoming the transitoriness of human life, in the penitentiary time is extruded from its embedding in social experience and refined. In the museum or library, the heterochrony ("hétérotopie du temps") is a utopia of access to all time past and present, in the fair ("hétérotopie chronique") it is a temporal utopia of preserving the moment of leisure against the intrusions of work, the seasons, death (see also Warning 2009: 13). By contrast, in the penitentiary, time dystopically transforms a limited sentence into a perceived eternity or potentially valuable time into an unremitting hell of worthless currency, into time which one cannot turn to one's own profit but only to that of the prison regime. Instead of being a resource for doing something (work or pleasure), time obtrudes itself as boredom and encumbrance; it becomes a burden rather than an enabling space, thus resulting in a feeling of oppression and confinement. Time moreover slows down due to the excessive routines informing carceral institutions. Every day is the same and seems an eternity. In prison, the quality of time changes from the pleasurable stasis of the fair or the happy conquest over the ravages of temporality in the museum, to a marked experience of deceleration which extends for more than a short interlude – a reason why carceral seclusion so rarely turns into idle leisure. Both

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23 Warning (2009: 39) notes that an earlier 1966 version was used in a two-part radio talk by Foucault (7 and 21 December). Warning's study on the heterotopic develops Foucault's concept in interesting directions focusing on literary production as a heterotopic space.

24 For an excellent discussion of Foucault's heterotopia and heterochrony concepts and their application to literary texts see Warning (2009). On time in prison see Nathan C. Heard's House of Slammers, where Old Simpson tells Beans: "You do the time; don't let the time do you" (cited Massey 1989: 197).
the museum and the fair could even be said to achieve their virtual stasis and longevity by, paradoxically, an intensive acceleration, namely by the compression of all human experience into one space or all annually recurrent rituals into one day. In fact, libraries, museums, fairs and festivals are prime examples of leisure spaces and scenarios of pleasurable idleness precisely because they manage to step away from the relentless progression of time towards death and dissolution. They also invoke the renewal of life and knowledge in the perception of the ever-same (the fair) or the creative reinvention based on tradition (the library). Such a renewal is also supposed to occur in prisons since the apparent suspension of temporal sequence is alleged to facilitate a concentration on one's conscience and make possible a conversion experience in a space of liminality. However, since imprisonment lasts for a long time, moral change occurs in a latent manner and remains hidden under the daily experience of uniformity and seemingly illimitable temporal extension of no-time, of u-chrony.

Foucault's history of the prison has provoked a number of critical responses. Alford (2000), for instance, argues that Foucault is wrong in his historical analysis because surveillance is not necessary to the achievement of control. Based on his experience of maximum-security facilities, Alford claims that the recent trend towards the warehousing of prisoners (Herivel/Wright 2003) and the increased technical possibilities for ensuring the impossibility of escape allow for control without disciplining. Indeed, it could be maintained that since the 1980s, at least in the USA, the Foucauldian model has been replaced by a penal system that, since it is no longer reform-oriented, has ceased to put prisoners' work at the centre of its raison d'être, giving rise to widespread idleness among the inmate population. As Rhodes (2004: 175) remarks, the current policy of warehousing is based on "risk-based detention", i.e. incapacitation, which in fact reflects a total risk-aversion strategy; it eliminates all persons from public space who are felt to be a potential risk (see also Parenti 1999). Moreover, penal politics in the USA was, already in the nineteenth century, significantly determined by the model of slavery (cp. Whitman 2005; C. Smith 2009; see also Chapter 6 below) and began to develop a penal system that kept downtoning the panoptic and disciplinary aspects which

Criticism of Foucault's theses from the historical profession has of course been extensive. See, among others, Proust et al. (1968), Johnston (1973), Perrot (1980), Garland (1986), Rothman (1995), Hagan (1996) and Alford (2000). Foucault's study has also generated a good deal of polemics in reference to its supposed reluctance to accommodate resistance to power. Said (1973: 245-6) chides Foucault for failing to imagine a better world and suggests that he has "imprisoned himself" (245) in his own theory. By way of rebuttal, Ransom (1997: 18-25) argues that Foucault correctly analyzed our situation of being caught in disciplinary networks which have no "outside" ("those networks of knowledge and power which constitute the forms of our modern enslavement" – Patton 1979: 114), but that the diffusion of power demonstrates the fragility of discipline as governance (Ransom 35-6, 76). Much of the criticism of Foucault in fact concerns his methodology which he believes has largely been misunderstood by his opponents (Foucault 1980: 29-30) – a diagnosis corroborated by Léonard (1980), Driver (1994), McGowen (1994) and Moussa (1996). This debate, however, is of no immediate relevance to this study.
were so prominently displayed in the trend-setting Philadelphia and New York experiments in the early nineteenth century.

Recent work on late medieval imprisonment (Geltner 2008) has moreover suggested that Foucault may have ignored developments in penal incarceration as early as the thirteenth century and that his chronology of the invention of the prison is therefore faulty. It is true that in the Italian city-states the conversion of fines into periods of imprisonment became a prominent trend, and that coercive incarceration (debtor who were thrown into jail in order to force them to pay) was turned into punitive imprisonment, with the model of the Inquisition smoothing the way for such a development (see Geltner 2008: 10-15, 44-7, 52-3). The Italian emphasis on state-run institutions with better sanitational and medical facilities and the city states' decision to build new prisons speak for a gradual realization that places of confinement needed to be run in a more efficient manner. However, this in no way undermines Foucault's argument. The invention of the penitentiary as a place in which prisoners are reformed through discipline remains a late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century innovation, even though the idea of forced labour derives from the Dutch fifteenth-century tuchthuizen models.26

Another modification of Foucault's theses suggests itself in the context of literary representations of the carceral. Whereas Foucault described a system focusing on the mass of prison inmates, hence on the fate of the ordinary thief or smuggler, literary texts predominantly concern themselves with individuals, traditionally often from a higher social class. Literature that includes prison settings is peopled with political prisoners, incarcerated royalty, cavaliers or saintly martyrs, who, although imprisoned under the old prison regime, were kept in solitary confinement and experienced many of the same dangers of sliding into insanity as did the inmates of the Philadelphia prison whom Dickens described in chapter 7 of his American Notes (vii; 1985: 144-59). In novels, even debtors of fairly modest means like Mr. Pickwick, Arthur Clennam (Little Dorrit) or Mr. Primrose, the vicar of Wakefield, have a room to themselves; and those thought to be dangerous like Caleb Williams are likewise kept segregated, at least during the night. Since cleanliness depended on one's ability to pay for better accommodation, much literature depicting the imprisoned hero has no need to focus on vermin, gaol fever or starvation. Some political prisoners even had servants tend to their needs (as did More, Raleigh and Mary Queen of Scots).

Although this book recognizes the significant shift that occurred in the wake of prison legislation in the 1770s, its major thrust is not Foucauldian. My emphasis is on perpetuation rather than discontinuity. Besides the already mentioned continuities between old and new

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26 See also Spierenburg (1996: 25-6), who pleads for a gradual evolution of the penitentiary from the conflux of a variety of pre-existing modes of punishment and confinement.
types of imprisonment, the focus in this volume will be on the recurrence of conceptions, images, symbolizations and fantasies of the carceral from the Middle Ages to the present. As will be explained in section 0.6 below, the major focus of my research has been to elucidate the metaphors of imprisonment in literary texts and to discuss their historical ramifications. Though, as we will see, some metaphors appear only in the nineteenth century, the majority of topoi and metaphors can be found in texts from the Middle Ages to the present. From a linguistic perspective, there is therefore overwhelming continuity despite institutional discontinuity in the factual realm.

Such an emphasis on the interpretation of the factual prison and on its textual rather than historical manifestation may seem to marginalize the power relations that underpin carceral spaces. However, this study will take questions of power and ideology very seriously indeed. Confinement is always the outcome of a legal and political constellation that exerts its brute force on individual subjects. Incarceration does not, merely, consist in a loss of ‘freedom’ but in the imposition on the inmate of rules and patterns of behaviour that are unfamiliar and unnatural to him/her. The prisoners are not only being disciplined in the Foucauldian sense but are subjected to the will of the authorities. One of the most basic differences between the old and the new prison lay in the invention of a completely new life for the prisoners in the penitentiary. Old style confinement simply locked up the criminal as one would lock up a dog or bear. You put the animal in its cage and continued feeding it what it ate in the wilderness. You deprived it of its ability to roam in its natural habitat, but basically were content to stop it from further depredations (incapacitation in legal parlance). In the new style of prison, you force your dog or bear to eat human food, sit at table and use knife and fork, and punish it if it will not behave itself. In this scenario the animal is forcibly humanized. In the concept of the penitentiary, the criminal subject is put into a moral laboratory, which deracines the inmate from his or her former lifestyle. Like a dog, the convict is meant to be disciplined so that he will turn into a well-behaved family pet. This simile, though it sounds preposterous, is underwritten by a long tradition of animal imagery in reference to the criminal subject (see Olson 2013).

Both incarceration and training rely on power, or exert force on the prisoner. Both are therefore cruel, though the savagery of the penitentiary is camouflaged by a concern for the physical welfare of the prisoners and by the grand aim of reformation through discipline. As Patton notes, Foucault’s study exposes the prison as a fundamentally hypocritical institution (1979: 141, 144). In its ethical analysis of the prison, this study stands firmly on the side of

27 But see Patton (1979: 121), who explains disciplining as an accumulation of coercive directions.

28 Foucault discusses pre-penitentiary tactics of punishment under the labels of (a) exclusion or banishment; (b) redemption or compensation; (c) marking, e.g. branding; and (d) confinement (2015: 2-4).
Foucault. I strongly agree with Foucault's contention that the new prison is ultimately as cruel as the old penal system, though the manifestations of carceral inhumanity are materially different. I also subscribe to the Foucauldian insight that prison does not work, has never worked and, as far as I can see, will never work. As I argue in Chapter 6, George Bernard Shaw was perfectly correct in his assessment of the institution of prison (Shaw 1914), and his proposals for its replacement are still worth pondering. Prisons are, of course, sites in which state violence is enacted (Albrecht 2008), and such exercise of force inevitably calls up questions of ethics, not merely regarding the ethics of (modes of) punishment, but also of the right to inflict punishment at all (see Gander et al. 2008). The inflicting of pain, both physical and psychological, keeps the penal practice of imprisonment tied to a continuing policy of retribution. Punishment and resocialization are mutually exclusive objectives. Yet the pains of imprisonment and the social policies which gave rise to them link up with a fundamental human proclivity towards revenge. Aggression, violence and sadistic retaliation are deeply ingrained in our behavioural patterns, and these psychological impulses determine much of our human conduct. Besides providing for social control of the lower classes through the creation of delinquency (Foucault 1979a: 251-6), the prison as institution generally serves to enforce social and political norms by criminalizing those that refuse to abide by them.

The most striking difference to Foucauldian analyses of prison, however, lies in my comparative downgrading of the panopticon as the key image for the prison and of surveillance as the most basic property of the penitentiary. Although I do comment on panopticism in some contexts (for instance, in 9.2) and have published on surveillance in Caleb Williams (Fludernik 2001a; see also 2016), most of the texts that I am looking at do not lend themselves to this particular approach. One very obvious historical reason for this can be traced to Foucault's emphasis on the invention of the penitentiary and on the Benthamite model in nineteenth-century British prison architecture. Though the cell system became current, the more specifically Benthamite panoptic architecture proved both impracticable and too expensive and was in fact installed in only a very few facilities. Most Victorian penitentiaries were star-shaped rather than round, thus making the kind of surveillance that Foucault analyzes impossible to achieve. Surveillance has only recently again come to play the role which Bentham envisaged: with the installation of video cameras in each cell, monitoring of inmates replicates and even improves on the Benthamite ideal of 'omniscient' surveillance (Lyon 2009). Maximum security facilities in the USA (supermaxes) arrange units in "pods", as they are called, which allow continual surveillance through a kind of small-size watchtower. (See Rhodes 2004 and Wacquant 2009b: 187-91.) In the earlier nineteenth and twentieth-century prisons, by contrast, it is Foucault's notions of disciplining and of work that are
central to the concept of incarceration and are foregrounded in the texts I analyze. Whereas, for Foucault, surveillance and discipline are co-terminous, two sides of the same coin, my intention is to separate the two strategies, and to explode the myth of the internalization of reformative behaviour as a consequence of continual surveillance. Rather, as I will argue, surveillance, such as it existed, was mainly a method of control and harassment, meant to facilitate disciplinary hold over the prison population. Discipline was less directed at producing a pattern inmate who, on release from the penitentiary, became the model factory worker, but to make all prisoners fit into one common mould. Foucault's ingenious insight that the penitentiary produced a common pool of delinquents for police to draw on in their search for suspects in fact exposes the bankruptcy of the reformative impulses underlying the institution. In my view, then, panopticism was an idea which failed given the reality of penal administration. Work discipline, on the other hand, plays an important role in most nineteenth-century depictions of the prison (see Chapter 7), and it is only in neo-Victorian novels like those by Sarah Waters (see 9.2.2) that panopticism and surveillance come to fulfil a significant though mostly metaphorical function. In his lectures Foucault himself implies the metaphoric quality of his panopticism when he equates disciplining with a "social panopticism" (2015: 219) and foregrounds "sequestration" as a prerequisite for the factory production mode (231-2).

I would like to note two important modifications that have been proposed to the current panoptic orthodoxy. The first comes from Gertrude Himmelfarb (1968/1995). As she points out, Bentham adopted the panopticon idea from his brother Samuel who devised it for his work on the estate of Prince Grigory Aleksandrovich Potêmkin at Krichev (Letter I; Bentham 1995: 34/1962a: 40). Himmelfarb's analysis of Bentham's panopticon differs considerably from that of most Anglophone literary critics, presumably because she alone takes into account Bentham's postscript to the original plan which throws considerable doubt on Bentham's noble humanitarianism. The panopticon plan turned into an obsession of Bentham's and apparently seemed to him to be the most promising way to make money as supervisor of the establishment. True, Bentham's plan emphasizes the warder's omniscience by "giv[ing] the illusion of a divine omnipresence" (1995: 35), with the result that the inmate is therefore interpellated to obey the rules of conduct and to internalize them. However, as Himmelfarb notes (41-4), Bentham departed from his earlier convictions, voiced in reference to the Penitentiary Act of 1779, which prescribed extensive accountability of the governor, to

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29 Since the selections of the 1995 edition of the panopticon writings are much more accessible, I am quoting the relevant passages from that edition where possible, as well as giving the references to the standard multi-volume Works throughout. On the invention of the panopticon to supervise the English (!) supervisors of the Russian workers see Christie (1993) and Werrett (1999).
insist on the public watching the prisoners from a platform as "the great open committee of the tribunal of the world" (Letter VI; Bentham 1995: 48/1962a: 46). This almost echoes Adam Smith's impartial spectator (1976: 293).

While he was originally in favour of single cells, where "the man is in his dungeon [...] very safe and quiet" (Letter XII; Bentham 1995: 66/1962a: 54), and praised "the salutary terrors of isolation, silence, darkness, and strangeness" (ibid.; see Himmelfarb 1995: 40), Bentham in the postscript distanced himself from the single cells, arguing that this was too harsh and cruel a punishment: "[It] enables you to screw up the punishment to a degree of barbarous perfection never yet given to it in any English prison" (Postscript, Part I, section v; 1962a: 71), echoing John Howard's reservations that absolute solitude was "more than human nature can bear, without the hazard of distraction or despair" (cited in Himmelfarb 46; Howard 1789: 169 fn.). Thus, from the earlier formula of "inspection, solitude, and contract", Bentham veered towards "a new trinity – lenity, severity, and economy" (Himmelfarb 49).

Housing three or four prisoners in one cell, the revised panopticon model begins to turn into a labour machine in which the inmates are to slave for fourteen, later even sixteen, hours a day, take "air and exercise" by "walk[ing] in a wheel" (thus anticipating the treadmill of later convict prisons – 1962a: 146-7, 147fn), and have to subsist on unpalatable food and minimal comforts (see Himmelfarb 1995: 51-3; 52). All of this, however, as Himmelfarb argues, was likely to increase the economic profit of the panopticon and to allow the contractor to enrich himself (49-53).

In the revised model the panopticon is in fact likened to a machine, and the inmates – in contrast to the emphasis placed on the interiority of moral improvement in the original version – are reduced to cogs in a wheel. Thus, Bentham advertised the panopticon to Jacques Brissot de Warville by calling it "a mill for grinding rogues honest, and idle men industrious" (Bentham 1962b: 226; cited Himmelfarb 63- 4). Himmelfarb also shows that even Henry Dundas, Pitt's Home Secretary (later Lord Melville), was won over by Bentham's "machine that gave the power of sight without eyes". These disclosures about Bentham's true motives tend to throw a very different light on the panopticon idea and somewhat downplay the

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30 See especially Bentham (1962a: 147-53) on a criticism of "only" ten hours of work a day and the incompatibility of hard labour hours with knitting; as well as pages 153-7 on diet, where Bentham argues that prisoners should receive the coarsest and cheapest food possible but in more than sufficient quantity. Janet Semple (1992, 1993) and Howell (2014) re-emphasize Bentham's humanitarian convictions.

31 From The Senator 10 (1794): 1162; qtd. Himmelfarb (1995: 65). Patton (1979: 135) also draws the parallel between prison and machine, as did conscientious objectors in English prisons ("the sense of being in the grip of a huge machine, which is felt to be repressive at every point, inhuman, aimless, tyrannical" – Bailey 1997: 300, citing Hobhouse/Brockway 1922: 561). In an interview, Foucault characterized the panopticon in similar terms: "c'est une machine où tout le monde est pris, aussi bien ceux qui exercent le pouvoir que ceux sur qui ce pouvoir s'exerce" (Barou 1977: 21). On the prison as machine see also Chapter 7.
importance of discipline as a means of creating voluntary conformity to social norms of thrift and industry. More so than in the utopian early versions of the panopticon, the institution delineated in the Postscript is one that powerfully welds together surveillance, slave labour and oppressive disciplining. Its supposed humanitarian credentials suffer accordingly. Yet Bentham's proposals are perhaps only inconsistent; his expressions of sympathy (for instance in his note on the unfairness of labelling people who have "yielded for once to the momentary impulse of some transient temptation" as "felons" – 1962a: 76) keep being cancelled out by his punitive attitudes ("little more than half the labour the honest poor [...] are forced to go through in order to live, is a lot too hard for felons!" – 1962a: 147).

Foucault's theses have also been significantly questioned in a second more recent landmark study of Victorian governance, Lauren M.E. Goodlad's *Victorian Literature and the Victorian State* (2003b), a book that develops and modifies arguments about the influence of Benthamite reforms on the rise of state bureaucracy in nineteenth-century England. While Goodlad in general is concerned with the ambivalence in Victorian times between a trend towards efficiency and centralization on the one hand and, on the other, a widespread resistance to bureaucracy under the banner of charity, humanitarian sympathy and laissez-faire economics, she also outlines several aspects in Foucault's understanding of Bentham which a study of Bentham's text tends to undermine. Thus Goodlad points out that in Bentham's model the watcher stands in the place of God, and this deification is underlined by the fact that the contractor is not held responsible for the running of the prison. And yet this lack of accountability escapes Foucault:

[...] Foucault's account of the panopticon becomes, in effect, the kind of flawed Marxist analysis he seeks to avoid: an Althusserian-like theory in which reified "Ideological State Apparatuses" (such as the Panopticon) directly dominate through subject constitution [...] Thus, the shift from "exceptional discipline" to "generalized surveillance" (Foucault 1979a: 209) enables Foucault to specify that discipline should not be identified with institutions but should be understood as "a type of power" and "a modality for [power's] exercise" (215). (Goodlad 2003a: 544)

Foucault, according to Goodlad, is thus blind to the direct exercise of power exerted over prison inmates in Bentham's model, which is much more immediately state-sponsored than he allows for. Goodlad goes on to argue that Foucault's work in *The History of Sexuality* is

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32 See also Bentham's very reasonable remarks on the idiocy of trying to teach industry to people by making them hate work ("making it either odious or infamous", turning it into a "bugbear"; 1962a: 144).

33 References to Foucault are to the same edition that I am quoting from.
more easily compatible with materialist concepts of power, and that by locating normalization processes on the level of symbolic representations of power, this revised model of governance provides for "the potential to resist norms" (545). Both Himmelfarb's and Goodlad's criticisms of the panopticon are important in demonstrating that Foucault's use of Bentham needs to be questioned in its application to the penitentiary as a state institution. This is especially relevant for literary scholars on account of Foucault's centrality in literary theory and criticism.

Literary scholars have picked up on Foucault's insights and then transferred his model to different contexts. Thus, D. A. Miller's famous characterization of the Victorian novel's panoptic surveillance of the fictional characters by means of free indirect discourse is a canny rhetorical move (Cohn calls it the "panoptic conceit" – 1999: 163) that relies on the panopticon as a metaphoric resource. However, surveillance of a panoptic kind plays no role in prison texts of the nineteenth century. What does get emphasized again and again is non-panoptic supervision, especially the attempt to suppress talk and enforce complete silence in pursuance of the American model of the "silent system".35 Likewise, being looked at through the spy hole of one's cell appears as a recurrent topos in prison writings. The realities of Victorian and early twentieth-century incarceration simply do not reflect panoptic surveillance in the manner devised by Bentham and popularized by Foucault. On the other hand, as critical readings of literary texts often illustrate, the carceral experience is crucially determined by the power of the gaze, especially the warders' or guards' controlling and disciplinary gaze on the prisoner. It is the hierarchical imbalance between the inmate's and the warder's gaze that constitutes the power of control and subjection in the carceral scenario; the prisoner's gaze in fact often comes to be deployed in a subversive manner, assuming reciprocity and equality where authority and compliance with it are required by the carceral regime.

The use of the panopticon in literary criticism is mostly that of a master trope (Punday 2000: 513; Fludernik 2016/forthcoming). It is employed to discuss, for instance, the author

34 Miller (1988: 25-27); see also the debates between Cohn (1995a, b, 1999: 163-80), Bender (1987, 1995), and Seltzer (1984, 1995). Ermarth (1997: 121-2) like Cohn has also criticized totalizing panoptic readings of Victorian fiction. More recently, Foucault's panopticon has been extended towards an analysis of "disciplinary societies" and "societies of control" (Deleuze 1988: 41, Deleuze 1992: 4) on to the "maximum surveillance society" (Norris/Armstrong 1999). Werrett (1999) has even identified the panopticon as an instrument of Russian absolutism. Rosen/Santesso (2010), by contrast, foreground Bentham's roots in eighteenth-century sentimentalism and criticize the exaggerated demonic readings of the panopticon in the tradition of Foucault and Miller. A particularly insightful contribution is Friedberg's (2010) analysis of the panopticon in comparison to other nineteenth-century scopic regimes and affordances.

35 On the "silent system" see McGowen (1995: 99-101) and Rothman (1995: 116-22). It was instituted at Auburn, New York, and contrasted with the "separate system" practiced at Philadelphia. While the silent system allowed inmates to congregate for work and meals, the separate system isolated prisoners in their cells at all times.
(or narrator) vs. character relation or narrative handling of point of view (Miller 1988); or, in the texts of Angela Carter and Sarah Waters (see 9.2 below), the panopticon functions as a "haunt" (Rhodes 2004: 15). Foucault's own text deploys Bentham's model as an image, an exemplum which symbolizes the disciplinary mode of punishment in contrast to the image of Damiens' execution, which serves as the prototype of ancien régime penal policy. Foucault's use of the panopticon and of Damiens is therefore figural: the panopticon is a metaphor or analogue for penitentiary discipline and surveillance. Foucault's textualization of Bentham can in fact be read as an aesthetically grounded strategy (Loesberg 2006). It is therefore entirely appropriate that in this book the panopticon emerges as one of metaphors analyzed in my research. One could additionally argue that Foucault's theses are situated at a macro-level of penal effects and that what I am focusing on in this book is a micro-level of textual, especially metaphoric, manifestations of carcerality. While Foucault outlines changes in the strategies of penal politics, this study concentrates on literature and on how the experience of imprisonment, as mirrored and projected in literary texts, continues to foreground a limited set of typical scenarios, familiar topoi and recurrent tropes. Though Foucault provides the theoretical theatre, our camera is zooming in on the actors in the spectacle of punishment and on its linguistic evocation in figurative language. Literary representation projects a spectacle by means of plot, language, and images, a spectacle that transforms the loci of historical or factual correction into sites of imaginary transference, of empathy, sensationalist thrill and punitive delight. In other words, literature (metaphorically speaking) provides a staged performance for the reader, and it is this spectacle that will feature as the centre of our investigations in the following chapters.

0.3 Spatial Symbolism and Carceral Topography

Much has been written about prison architecture (Evans 1982, N. Johnston 1973, 2000), and readers will be familiar with many visual representations of carceral space. From Piranesi's carceri with their Escher-like absurdities of Gothic arches, vaults, cavities, liana-like chains, and flights of staircases, to Romantic images of misery in dungeons (for instance in the paintings of Joseph Wright of Derby), and on to the twentieth-century prison film with its recurrent focus on corridors and galleries framed by iron bars and steel gateways – we seem to be very familiar with carceral spaces past and present. Many of these images are phantasms born of deep-seated fears and anxieties (this seems to be true of the Piranesi prints); some are politically motivated exaggerations (Derby's medievalized illustration of an entirely fantastic scene from Sterne's Sentimental Journey); and many others are all too
true, though the veracity of the setting may belie the sensationalist quality of such films and their plots.

Clearly, prison space is important to the inmate; its crowding, dirt and lack of sanitary facilities figure prominently in pre-nineteenth-century accounts; the bareness, sterility and discomfort of the cell (which will be the prisoner's 'home') feature in many nineteenth and twentieth-century descriptions. Postcolonial prisons, as we will see (Chapters 3 and 6), often combine both of these aspects, adding overcrowding to minimalist furnishings and resuscitating the conditions of filth, disease and even near-starvation that were current in early modern European jails. It is precisely on account of the ubiquitously disheartening depictions of prison space that one will tend to find Christopher's appreciative depiction of his arrest cell in Mark Haddon's *The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-time* (2003) funny, odd or counter-intuitive:

*It was nice in the police cell. It was almost a perfect cube, 2 metres long by 2 metres wide by 2 metres high. It contained approximately 8 cubic metres of air. It had a small window with bars and, on the opposite side, a metal door with a long, thin hatch near the floor for sliding trays of food into the cell and a sliding hatch higher up so that policemen could look in and check that prisoners hadn't escaped or committed suicide. There was also a padded bench.* (2004: 17)

Christopher, as a boy with Asperger's syndrome, has problems connecting with people, and he is happiest when by himself. From his idiosyncratic perspective, therefore, the idea of being an astronaut all alone in a spaceship in outer space engenders feelings of happiness rather than fright (65-6), and hence he feels serene in his cell — unlike many other people when first locked up. What Christopher focuses on is the narrowness of the space (which he likes), its bareness and its neatness. He also focuses on the window and the door. These for him signal enclosure and hence security, in contrast to other arrestees who panic when the door is shut on them. The most noticeable difference in Christopher's reaction concerns his inability to appreciate the emotional threat of being shut in: for him being in the cell connotes the pleasurable feeling of a lack of harassment.

Quite a different attitude towards prison space is evinced by Rubashov, the protagonist of Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* (1941), who surveys his cell with the practised eye of a prison veteran, checking whether all the necessary items are in place:

*The cell door slammed behind Rubashov.

He remained leaning against the door for a few seconds, and lit a cigarette. On the bed to his right lay two fairly clean blankets, and the straw mattress looked*
newly filled. The wash-basin to his left had no plug, but the tap functioned. The can next to it had been freshly disinfected, it did not smell. The walls on both sides were of solid brick, which would stifle the sound of tapping, but where the heating and drain pipe penetrated it, it had been plastered and resounded quite well; besides, the heating pipe itself seemed to be noise-conducting. The window started at eye-level; one could see down into the courtyard without having to pull oneself up by the bars. So far everything was in order. (Koestler 1941: 3)

Koestler's protagonist is obviously familiar with worse cells: cells in which the blankets are much dirtier, the straw mat is filled with dirty straw, and the smell of the full slop-pail makes breathing hard. Moreover he has the experienced perspective of an old con, noting whether one can communicate with fellow inmates over the pipes. The cell is a good cell – one can even look into the yard.

Prison architecture thus has a significant influence on the physical well-being and state of mind of those confined within its walls, particularly as its furnishings can be manipulated to yield more or less comfort. (Chapter 7 illustrates the ingenious strategies of generating prisoners' discomfort in Victorian prisons.) In what follows I will briefly sketch the most important aspects of spatial symbolism in carceral contexts. I will concentrate on the experience of imprisonment as figured in symbolic terms in the spatiality of the prison cell. The coordinates of carceral topography rely on the container metaphor (INSIDE/OUT) and its specific carceral manifestations in the symbolic functionalization of walls, bars, doors, and windows. Subsequently, this basic metaphoric setup will be extended to a discussion of carceral liminality, showing how the threshold of doors, windows and even walls are symbolically deployed to create imaginary scenarios of transcendence. Such liminality figures also on the inside of the prison cell, on the prisoner's own body, whose corporality can be figured as an interface, a liminal site that becomes a battleground for penal manipulation and disciplining, though equally for the prisoner's mental resistance, even transcendence. All of these figurations depend on the prior assumption of a subject or an identity. Where the loss of subjecthood and the lack of self-identification become overwhelming (as they do in the anonymity of concentration camps), carceral symbolism loses its literary relevance.

INSIDE/OUT: The Carceral Container Metaphor

Recent metaphor theory (Lakoff 1987; M. Johnson 1987; Lakoff/Johnson 1980, 1989; Turner 1987, 1991) treats the metaphor of containment as a prototypical scenario in which

36 Parts of this section have previously been published in Fludernik (1999).
the subject or object resides within a container. Topographical moves concern egress from the container or ingress (entry) into it (to put something into; to take something out of). Idioms such as the German aus der Haut fahren (‘to explode,’ literally: ‘to move beyond one’s skin’) or sich in sich zurückziehen (‘to shell up,’ ‘to withdraw into oneself’) have recourse to such a topology of insides and outsides (BODY AS CONTAINER). This prototypical scenario of the container metaphor functionalizes the enclosing circumference of the container (for instance: walls; the body’s skin) as a typically liminal borderline between inside and outside, and it additionally expands the scenario to include points of egress or ingress (doors) as, for instance, the poetic metaphor of knocking on the door of the beloved(‘s heart). In the container metaphor the circumference is conceived of in neutral terms so that it allows for positive readings (withdrawing into oneself for security) as well as negative ones (barring the subject from the world at large). The circumference of the container therefore operates as a threshold, a boundary that can be transgressed in either direction, not as a boundary that is to be extended to infinity – the typical scenario of the frontier image. The container is a fundamental "image schema" in cognitive metaphor theory (M. Johnson 1987: 23-40), i.e. "structures that organize our mental representations at a level more general and abstract than that at which we form particular mental images" (23-4; see also Hampe/Grady 2005).

A second important aspect of the container metaphor concerns the qualitative difference between inside and outside. Unlike the crossing of a mere dividing line (to the other side of a street, across a political border into a neighbouring state), the boundary between inside and outside constitutes a true threshold whose crossing constitutes a marked qualitative difference. In leaving the container, one moves into a new or strange or dangerous territory (escape from captivity or venture into the unknown), while by entering the container one may both withdraw into safety or be expelled from the world and locked into a restraining hold. For instance, as R. Wilson comments in reference to a famous essay by Marjorie Garber, Marlowe’s protagonists aggressively exercise their excessive freedoms and imprison others, only to end up in "enclosure" with the "binder bound" (2011: 82; Garber 1977: 11-13). On the other hand, confinement can also serve to shut others out: "On bad days though, she [Sally] sees his [Ed's] stupidity as wilfulness, a stubborn determination to shut things out. His obtuseness is a wall, within which he can go about his business, humming to himself, while Sally, locked outside, must hack her way through the brambles with hardly so much as a transparent raincoat between them and her skin" (Atwood 1983: 135).

Moreover, agency – besides directionality – constitutes a significant element in the schematics of container metaphors. Whereas most discussions of the metaphor in cognitive

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linguistics visualize the schema in terms of putting something into a container or taking it out again, prison scenarios naturally focus on the passive mode of being locked up in the cell (external agency impinging on the victim) or on the frustration of agency (not being able to get out). Within the basic metaphor (CONTAINER) the specific prison metaphor therefore anthropomorphizes the spatial coordinates as either ingress or egress, or as transcendence and transgression, and it typically concerns a subject whose experiential self-identity structures the carceral space. For that reason, the prototypical scenarios of cognitive metaphor theory (putting something into the container or taking it out) provide a mere geometric relation which, in the prison scenario, is filled by the qualitatively inflected coordinates of subjectivity. Mark Johnson’s *The Body in the Mind* (1987: 45-7) discusses seven force schemata, among which compulsion, blockage and removal of constraint are the most relevant to physical confinement. Besides the infusion of space (the container) with experiential significance, there also emerges a spatialization of the threshold, which, in anthropological terms, correlates with the theme of transcendence (see 5.4 below). At the same time, transcendence cannot be quite disjoined from an ethnological aspect, that of liminality (see below).

The transcendental and liminal qualities of imprisonment are most forcefully illustrated in the frequent references to a fear of entombment with prison figured as the antechamber of death, a liminal space. Monastic enclosure, as we have already seen, was perceived as live burial. This correspondence between entombment and monastic enclosure persists into eighteenth-century anti-Catholic propaganda and into the representations of convents in the Gothic novel, where monastic institutions are automatically equated with involuntary imprisonment; key Gothic scenarios also include the dungeons of the Inquisition and live entombment for disobedient nuns (thus, most prominently, in Matthew Lewis’s *The Monk*). The Gothic novel moreover generally emphasizes the association of imprisonment with entombment: in Radcliffe’s *The Romance of the Forest* the underground vaults contain coffins as well as cells.

An even more prominent experiential correlate of incarceration is that of claustrophobia:

I followed the warder to a door, perhaps not more than two feet in width. She unlocked it and said, "Pass in." I stepped forward, but started back in horror. Through the open door I saw, by the dim light of a small window that was never cleaned, a cell seven feet by four. "Oh, don't put me in there!" I cried. "I can not bear it." The warder took me roughly by the shoulder, gave me a push, and shut the door. There was nothing to sit upon but the cold slate floor. I sank to my knees. I felt suffocated. It seemed that the walls were drawing nearer and nearer together, and presently the
life would be crushed out of me. I sprang to my feet and beat wildly with my hands against the door. "For God's sake let me out! Let me out!" But my voice could not penetrate that massive barrier, and exhausted I sank once more to the floor. (Maybrick 1905: 66-7)

The narrowness of the cell resembles a coffin; it threatens to suffocate the prisoner. This passage also figures three of the most important images connected with prison scenarios, those of the door, the (impenetrable) wall and the window. Doors and walls have remained prominent features of carceral topography throughout the centuries.38 Doors traditionally function as a fourth wall. One cannot look out through the door, it is a closed surface on the inside, even though the spyhole allows the guards to observe the prisoner from outside. Windows constitute the only permeable surface of the carceral topography, and it is this that lends them their symbolic significance. In the passage cited above, the narrator's claustrophobia is enhanced by the dirtiness and smallness of the window, thus giving her the feeling of being entirely 'boxed in'. In medieval and early modern contexts, though, windows were an avenue of communication. Medieval anchoresses had a window through which they communicated with their devotees and spiritual 'clients'. In medieval and early modern prisons, inmates could beg alms from passers-by through the barred windows giving access to the street. (See the illustration on the cover of Foucault's *Discipline and Punish.*39) By contrast, in the typical dungeon scenario, the prisoner is frequently being kept in unrelieved solitude and gloom, since the darkness of the prison cell is usually not much alleviated by barred windows (or thick, dirty, impenetrable glass in latter-day variants of the same). In Romantic poetry the dungeon window sometimes allows a glimpse of nature, thus providing some consolation to the mind of the prisoner,40 while at the same time exacerbating the anguish of confinement and of the deprivation of air, light and free movement. Doors, windows and walls are therefore to be seen as interdependent constituents of carceral topography. Let me take the three symbols in turn.

**Doors.** The most important opening of the prison cell, the door, constitutes a point of egress but also of ingress. Like the wall, it is therefore ambivalent in its positive and negative connotations. In his *Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation* (wr. 1534), Thomas More already noted the psychological significance of doors. Antony, More's mouthpiece, argues

38 Note, however, that the American penitentiary which – except in disciplinary segregation – has consistently replaced doors by bars is an exception to this rule.

39 The print is an engraving by Giorgio Ghisi called "The Prison, after Giulio Romano" from the sixteenth century, echoing Romano’s fresco from the Hall of Medallions in the Palazzo Te in Mantua. See [https://art.famsf.org/giorgio-ghisi/prison-after-giulio-romano-19581421](https://art.famsf.org/giorgio-ghisi/prison-after-giulio-romano-19581421) for the engraving.

40 See, e.g., Lord Byron's "The Prisoner of Chillon". Similarly, Helena's view from the upstairs bay window in Radcliffe's *The Italian* helps to soothe her anxiety and perturbation.
against the fears of "a certain woman" that the shutting of doors need not trigger emotionally charged reactions on the part of the prisoner since at night one regularly locks oneself in to be safe from robbers. Characteristically, Antony negates the very powerful feelings of claustrophobia and suffocation induced by enclosure, denigrating them by recourse to rational argument and emotional self-control:

For by my trouth quod she [the woman visitor] / yf the dore shuld be shit vppon me, I wold wene yt wold stopp upp my breeth / At that word of hers / the prisoner laughed in his mynd / but he durst not laugh a lowde nor say nothing to her / For somewhat in dede he stode in awe of her / & had his fyndyng there mich part of her charite for almoyse / but he could not but laugh inwardly / while he wist well inogh that she vsid on the inside to shit euery night full surely her own chamber to her, both dore & wyndowes to / & vsid not to open them of all the long night / And what difference than as to the stoppyng of the breth, whether they were shit vpp within or without. (More 1976a: 277)

As we learn from a different source (Crewe 1990: 92), the scene echoes More's arguments with his wife. The situation does not lack a certain touch of humour, yet the female fearfulness ridiculed in the text reflects the experience of claustrophobic trauma. Antony's (and More's) rational debunking of the woman's emotions tries to deny the reality of the psychological effects of imprisonment.

The double function of the door – shutting out danger and shutting the prisoner in – is dealt with in an even more complex manner in Richardson's Clarissa. Clarissa shuts herself into her room at Mrs. Sinclair's both before and after the rape, and later she refuses to go to sleep in the prison room of the sponging house because there is no lock on the inside and she fears to be surprised (L 333; Richardson 1987: 1055, 1057): "Why these double locks, and bolts all on the outside, none on the in?" (1057). Clarissa's fear of a violent incursion into her private sphere (hitherto safeguarded by her own lock and key) naturally connotes her (justified) fear of sexual depredation, of the violation of her (physical) integrity. More's apostrophized scenario of locking himself in similarly implies a concern for his own (spiritual) integrity. The door keeps the resident safe from violent intrusion. It is no coincidence that More in his letters compares his predicament with that of a woman about to be raped so that, no longer being a virgin (who are exempted from that particular law), she may be executed (More 1910: 240-1). While More's wife considers enclosure as such, hence as an imagined...
deprivation of movement, her husband conceives of his imprisonment as safety from the violence that he fears will be visited on him. For him there is no real freedom outside prison; the threat of execution is temporarily stalled while he is 'on hold', shut up in the cell.

In an excellent article on the imagery of Shakespeare's sonnets, Heather Dubrow (1997: 518, 529-34) has documented the pervasive ambivalence between shutting out danger and being locked up as dangerous in Shakespeare's work. She calls this "the paradoxical workings of locks and chests: do they protect persons within from an outside marauder or imprison them lest they wreck harm themselves?" (529). Dubrow helpfully combines this ambivalence with Elizabethan and Jacobean worries about thieves and vagrants, but she also discusses a third type of situation in which locks figure prominently, namely when a precious jewel is stowed away for safekeeping, or when the lock is to secure the virginity of a daughter or the chastity of a wife, which might otherwise be purloined (533-5). (Note the double meaning of *raptus*: 'rape' and 'robbery'.) We thus have a third scenario in which the jailer is a positive figure, functioning like the protective wall against intruders and robbers. We will return to this connection in the context of Thomas Middleton's *Women Beware Women* (see 4.5.1).

**Walls and Transcendence.** Walls as barriers operate both as a limit to physical movement and as a symbol of carceral violence. The unbreachable wall, like the door, shuts the prisoner in, but it also encloses him in a motherly embrace. (The allusion is to Nabokov's "walls with their arms around each other's shoulders" – 2001: 29.) In parallel with doors, walls underline the ambivalence of incarceration. "Stone walls do not a prison make, nor iron bars a cage", as Richard Lovelace (and much romantic poetry after him) argues. The barriers of enclosure (stone or metal bars) seem materially impenetrable, yet they can be overcome by negating their very presence, by converting the physical and material into the spiritual and mental. There are of course instances of prison-breaking in hagiography (St. Peter, St. Quentin), in the picaresque tradition, in the literature of (criminal) (auto)biography, in *Caleb Williams* (see 5.4.1) all the way to Dumas' *The Count of Monte Cristo*, with Fallaci's *Un uomo* (1979) a rare twentieth-century instance for serious literature. More generally, however, prison walls in prison literature become permeable either through the mental/spiritual projection of the prisoner into the realm of the transcendental (God, peace, love), or through the consolatory ingress of spiritual help, visions of God, of angels providing food. The wall can thus be (temporarily) nullified either through the passive acceptance of external solace, or through active efforts towards transcendence. Like the door, the wall constitutes a boundary that allows itself to be manipulated from both sides. The prisoner's desire for es-

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42 The autobiography of John Gerard and Cellini's *Life* are two of the most sensational instances.
cape (egress) is balanced by the possibility of succour from outside (ingress), which – since it is spiritual succour – does not carry any of the negative overtones of violence or penetration.

In Romantic poetry the prisoner often actively transcends her carceral environment and unites with the realm of the spirit. Imagination (receiving succour from the beyond) is replaced by intuitive projection. Even in Romantic poetry, however, idealistic treatments of imprisonment are counterpointed by descriptions of acute dejection and despair, accounts that either neglect to consider the very possibility of spiritual comfort (thus, in the imaginary 'picture' of the wasted prisoner that Yorick projects in Sterne's *Sentimental Journey*) or trace the attempt at spiritual escape and its merely transitory effect on the prisoner's psyche. Thus, in "The Prisoner of Chillon," Bonnivard is consoled by the beauty of Lake Chillon and the sublimity of the mountain range beyond it, but experiences his detention as even more insupportable thereafter (st. xiii). Likewise, the prisoner of Emily Brontë's poem tastes the delicious joys of immersion in the beyond, only to be recalled to her chains and the intolerable remoteness of delivery through death. (See section 5.4.2.)

In late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century texts this transcendental element becomes increasingly secularized. Arthur Clennam in Dickens' *Little Dorrit*, like Yorick's imaginary prisoner, has no stamina to transcend his carceral predicament, be it his symbolic imprisonment in the London of his childhood (Bk. I, ch. iii) or the actual physical confinement in the Marshalsea (Bk. II, ch. xxvii, xxix). Clennam is saved almost reluctantly through the love of Little Dorrit and his reciprocation of it. Amy, like the angel in the saints' legends, enters his prison in order to offer consolation, and she feeds him with food both aesthetic (flowers) and spiritual (words) as well as real comestibles. As a present-day equivalent one could note Amnesty International's letters for prisoners campaign. For detainees such mail constitutes one of the most important comforts received from outside.

**Windows.** Like the doors of the prison, windows allow for ingress and egress. They are openings on the world, whose beyond does not hold the potential dangers of torture or execution. Windows, if accessible to prisoners at all, can provide views of nature, thus allowing a communion of souls with the pantheistic sublime ("The Prisoner of Chillon"), or they may yield access to the prison yard and a glimpse of other prisoners, or provide information about the weather and access to snatches of conversation (Koestler, *Darkness at Noon*; Soyinka's *the man died*; Lathom's *The Midnight Bell*). Windows therefore provide a specifically positive entry-point for consolation from outside. In most carceral settings, however, the window remains inaccessible to the prisoners even when standing on tiptoe on their plank, camp-bed or chair. Sometimes the window has been boarded up (Soyinka) and fitted with heavy dark glass so as to obstruct any outside view (Maybrick), even if it allows at least
some measure of light and air to pass through. Indeed, the presence of nonfunctional windows that do not even let in sufficient quantities of fresh air (Constance Lytton, Prisons and Prisoners, ch xi; 1988: 225-7) or actively add to the prisoners' discomfort by channelling draughts and cold air into their cells (Soyinka; Lewin) is a recurrent topos of twentieth-century prison autobiographies and must have been a notable factor in damp medieval dungeons as well. Worse, though, than a prison with an inaccessible window that lets in chilling draughts is a cell without any window at all and whose only points of egress and ingress besides the door are the ventilation slots and the peephole on the door.

Some prison windows allow access to the outside only indirectly. In Nadine Gordimer's Burger's Daughter (1979) father and daughter receive their only access to sunshine through reflection from an opposite wall, and that little sunlight is spoiled by the shadow of their window's iron bars: "Lionel said how the sun never came into his cell, only the coloured reflection of some sunsets, that would make a parallelogram coated with delicate pearly light, broken by the interruption of the bars, on the wall opposite his window" (Gordimer 1980: 64). Only a "watermark of light" remains at second remove to raise the prisoner's morale (Gordimer 361). Light, particularly sunlight, of course, signifies not merely contact with the outside, providing information about the time of day and the weather, but symbolically relates to knowledge and to hope. Obstruction of light therefore signalily impairs prisoners' morale, as do the emblematic iron bars which emphasize the prisoner's confinement in iconic fashion.

While views through the window allow access to a world beyond the restrictions of physical incarceration, windows also make possible the ingress not only of light and air but also of sound and even of wildlife (birds). The window therefore serves to underline the contrast between Nature (light, air) and symbolic Death (in the prison tomb), and between animacy (voices, human and animal life) and the enforced inanimacy of the prisoner. This idealistic topography of the cell characteristically suppresses the ingress of vermin and rodents – wildlife with which the dungeon typically teems. The singing of birds, in the absence of music or the human voice (except for the daunting coldness and perfunctoriness of the discourse addressed to the prisoner by the prison guards43), symbolically provides access to the voice of Nature, to the voice and language of the soul. Conversely, voice is able to penetrate to the outside if there is a window, no matter how barred, and this in turn constitutes one of the few active avenues of communication available to the detainee, indeed a possible strategy of rebellion and political protest.44

43 Haney et al. (1973) describe the discourse of the warders as hortative and denunciative.
44 See Ruth Wyner's delight to hear "a blackbird sing" (2003: 22), "blithely unaware of the value of its freedom", and George Meredith's poem "The Two Blackbirds" (1850/1912).
Whereas Renaissance prisoners were able to ask for alms through the 'grates' of the prison windows (and were generally accessible to friends, family and charitable souls), the modern-day prison system has barred inmates from outside contact and consolation with an ever more refined instrumentarium of restrictions on prisoners' communicational options. Not only are inmates imprisoned singly and in total isolation from their families, who were earlier allowed to share, and thereby alleviate, the sufferings of the detainee; communication even with the closest relatives is regimented and regulated by strict rules which also cover the exchange of letters. Visits, when they are allowed at all, take place in the anodyne atmosphere of mass anonymity and surveillance, destroying any vestiges of privacy or intimacy. The solitude of imprisonment indeed constitutes one significant aspect of that chilliness of prison life ("le froid pénitentiaire" – Buffard 1973) which the new prison paradigm has perfected with the glacial cruelty intrinsic to the system's fundamental purpose of ultimate depersonalization.

Bars and Cages. Iron bars – just like shackles – recur in the prototypical imaging of enforced confinement. Yet, imprisonment metaphors also employ another scenario, that of the cage rather than the tomb and the wall. Although window bars and grates figure prominently in the historical reality of carceral architecture, cages – at least in England – never became a routine manner of confinement, and it has taken twentieth-century barbarity to institutionalize the iron cage in the (American) penitentiary system.45 (On the cage see Chapter 5.) What strikes one today as the most humiliating aspect of the cage, its complete denial of privacy – an aspect that constitutes a cruel refinement of the Benthamite panoptic surveillance model – is not part of the traditional figuration. In the medieval and early modern prison, bars are predominantly treated from the perspective of the prisoner behind them looking out, rather than that of the penetrating gaze of the warder. Historically, this can be explained with reference to the topology of the old prison: bars were primarily bars on windows: caging, if practised at all in England, was part of public exposure as spectacle, part of a continuum of forms of punishments whose very indignity constituted their disciplinary, correctional and deterrent purpose: pillorying, stocking, caging and whipping at the cart's tail.46 For instance, in The Pilgrim's Progress, Christian's and Faithful's passio in the town of Vanity Fair includes caging as a method of pillorying the two pilgrims, exposing them to the crowd's ridicule and verbal abuse. Christian and Faithful are displayed like dangerous beasts or

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45 Prominent twentieth-century cases of caging are the treatment of Ezra Pound (Kimpel/Eaves 1981) or that of American soldiers in Vietnam.

46 Caging also occurred during transportation to the place of execution, as a milder form of hurdling and an alternative to simple carting.
monsters. The main emphasis is therefore on their suffering as spectacle, not on their confinement.

Bars in fictional prison settings and in fictional metaphoric use often serve to symbolize confinement and/or its mental toll, emphasizing the prisoner's barred access to the world outside, the worlds he can see and desire but not reach through the space between the bars. The despair resulting from the futility of wishing to escape is rendered by the prisoner's attempt to shake the bars – the equivalent of pounding on the locked door:

As soon as it was moonlight and that poor thing began to crawl and shake the pattern [of bars], I got up to help her. I pulled and she shook. I shook and she pulled, and before morning we had peeled off yards of that paper [the wallpaper]. ("The Yellow Wallpaper"; Gilman 1980: 17)

Here, the narrator's feelings of imprisonment are projected on the imaginary figure of the woman in the wallpaper. This paper is imaged as both a confining circumference and as a liberating threshold. The liberating quality of the wallpaper relates to the narrator's fantasy of helping the woman behind it escape from her confinement by peeling off the paper from the wall (the figuring of the wall as 'mere' paper is a first aspect of deconstructing the carceral setting). At the same time, the narrator defuses her own feeling of traumatic enclosure by projecting it behind the wall/paper, deftly turning her 'inside' into the (free, non-traumatic) outside. She reconceptualises the walls of her room as an interface yielding onto a prison beyond it, in which her alter ego is encaged. In this manner she is able to project her own feelings on the fantasy image of the prisoner behind the bars and to assume an active role in achieving freedom for herself, liberating the woman. In reality it is she herself who is imprisoned and unable to actively liberate herself.47

Let me now turn to the symbolic and metaphoric extensions of this basic scenario involving doors, walls, windows and bars. A complementary model would be Bachelard's whose focus on the house as an area of intimacy and solace spells out the blessings of reclusiveness but also considers small-scale containers like the nest, the drawer or snail's houses (Bachelard 1958).

**Corporality and Liminality.** I have noted above that representations of enclosure typically compensate the carceral experience by figuring the interface of ingress or egress as a potentially liberating threshold. The negative conceptualization of the prison as a tomb

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47 For an analysis of the story see 9.4.1 below. See also Nathan C. Heard's observation: "I am not saying that there shouldn't be prisons, but there shouldn't be bars. Behind bars, a man never reforms. He will never forget. He never will get completely over the memory of the bars" (cited Massey 1989: 196).
thereby participates in Christian typology's positive connotations of the tomb as a liminal space that prepares for subsequent resurrection. Moreover, as we have seen, emissaries from beyond the walls (angels, birds) frequently visit the imprisoned subject, who in turn reaches out to them by the force of his or her prayer, through projective meditation and vocal or imaginative transposition.

The traditional topology functionalizes two concepts, that of the body and that of the restricted space of the cell, and it transcends both in the spiritual flight of the prisoner beyond the confines of corporality and beyond the material barrier of the dungeon walls. The new prison scenario, that of the penitentiary, by contrast, impacts on prisoners' bodies by instrumentalizing their access to consumer goods for the purposes of correctional disciplining; it thereby disperses the prison subject into its non-physical 'appendices' which are, however, crucial to the preservation of the inmate's personal identity and his/her mental survival. Whereas the dungeon or oubliette confined and de-limited the body physically by locking it away, most post-panoptic spaces of incarceration are confining yet at the same time maximally exposural, thereby undermining prisoners' ideational control over their very bodies. Confinement is no longer primarily experienced as a restriction of (centrifugal) physical movement but as an (ingressive) invasion of the private sphere, an invasion that renders both the actual cell and the prisoner's body itself transparent to external forces. The old prison scenario had a palpable wall which prisoners faced, a material obstacle which invited attempts to scale it or break through it. Escape was possible at least in principle. Such physical confinement also allowed for a possibly benign reading as security and protection, indeed provided material for the fantasy of a 'happy prison' (Brombert 1978) of self-sufficient creativity in exile from the world. Once the jailor had departed, the prison cell could provide an intimate locus of personal space and safeguard the inmate's physical integrity. As Blume (1965, 1970) has argued in his evocations of the 'lyricism of the cell', such scenarios persist in existentialist prisons.

The topos of transcendence, one could therefore argue, replaces the notion of escape within a non-physical, spiritual or merely mental context. Actual physical imprisonment is nullified by imaginative liberation, real corporal restraint cancelled out by an abnegation of the body, and the suffering of actual physical pain disavowed. In all of these configurations the magic trick consists in a thorough-going repudiation of the body, of corporal reality **tout court**. Such abnegation or **contemptus mundi** (see 2.3), was of course theologically supported by the model of the hagiographic scenario. The threshold which prisoners cross into transcendence therefore corresponds to a **translatio** into acorporality, either as a conversion into the non-tangible realm of spirituality, or as a rupture with life, an entry into the beyond that requires the destruction of the body.
Carceral enclosure correlates with a prominent functionalization of the material enclosural circumference: the wall, the body, the bars of the cage. These delimiting barriers are breachable and permeable boundaries which incorporate a transitional area of interfacing, they are thresholds that lend themselves to an application of Victor Turner's concept of liminality.

Turner (1969) analyses a number of rites that revolve around interfacial practices designed to provide a transition space between two social states. Thus, in the chief's installation rite of the Ndembu (Zambia), the prospective king undergoes a period of abuse and humiliation by his later subjects: "a chief is just like a slave (ndung'u) on the night before he succeeds" (cited 1969: 101). The practice is designed to remind the future king that he is a mere citizen and at the mercy of his tribe, and it also helps him to alleviate his guilt that he may be unworthy of his new role by proleptically punishing him for that unworthiness and thereby preparing him for his imminent function. In another example of Turner's, a hole is dug in the ground in which the liminal subject has to remain imprisoned before being 'resurrected' after an interval of a few days. Both the hut of the prospective chief and the hole for the novices are referred to as places of death (100). Tellingly, neophytes are forced to endure their rite de passage in a state of sexual continence, near-nakedness and starvation. The temporary prison of the initiation rite figures as a liminal stage to be traversed on the way to a new identity.

The traditional scenario of carceral enclosure with its emphasis on transcendence therefore illustrates typically liminal phenomena. In so far as prison is conceived as a transitional site between the world (life) and death (execution), or as an intermediary fall into corporality (the soul suffers a temporary imprisonment in the body), the concept of liminality provides a powerful ethnological frame for a literary or theological analysis. It helps to foreground the transitional aspects of imaginative translation into spirituality and focuses on the emotional metamorphosis undergone by prison inmates. Moreover, the concept of liminality can be used to characterize the process of entry into prison, which was traditionally structured by several practices such as the payment of fees, putting on chains, and the payment of garnish to the other inmates. In this context, the crossing from the state of liberty into the territory of the prison (called the induction process in modern carceral facilities – Alber 2007: 29-30), corresponds to the step across a liminal threshold, marked by a series of liminal sites (Bender 1987: 27-8). The typical carceral tomb imagery evidently shows a strong affinity with the structure of liminality, as does the theological image of spiritual rebirth.

Besides these rather clichéd patterns of liminality, prisoners' corporality itself can be interpreted as liminal to the extent that the erosion or intensification of body experience in the modern prison serves to attenuate the prisoner's self-identity. The neat dichotomy of
body and mind, which persists in all ideologies of the abnegation of the body, comes under attack as soon as one foregrounds the interfacial aspects of imprisonment. Already in the traditional theological scenario the body rewrites its corporality as incarceration (the BODY AS PRISON metaphor), thereby conflating inside and outside. Pressures brought to bear on the body are thus reconceptualized as attacks on the prison which will help to liberate the soul. Compare, for instance, John Donne’s famous holy sonnet, "Batter my Heart" (l.1): the heart imprisons the soul, which needs to be freed by a military attack on its jailer.

By the same token, the carceral of physical self-control may produce a liminal state of neurosis which will either develop into insanity or result in strategic rebellion and oppositional tactics. In all of these cases, a psychological threshold is induced by physical means, a threshold that characteristically eludes linguistic designation and prepares for a complete surrender or provides access to mental energies beyond conscious mental control (Scarry 1985). Just as the prison itself in pre-nineteenth-century contexts is a liminal site (the prisoner’s itinerary runs from freedom through his or her temporary sojourn in jail to the impending assizes and, possibly, death by execution), likewise the body in its carceral environment turns into a liminal site on which the very concept of embodiment is dissolved by the impact of the transgressive and destructive psychological and physical forces impinging on the prisoner’s body or emanating from it.

My reading of liminality as constituting both a boundary line and a border area or zone that negotiates various types of inside and outside phenomena is of course metaphorical. It oscillates between a conceptualization of the threshold as a boundary line whose crossing may have transgressive implications, and the application of a spatial container metaphor to the threshold, which is then read as an interface, a temporary home, a site of transition and conversion. The second of these two options has been used by Bender (1987: 45-51) to characterize the early modern English descriptions of the prison as limbo, instanced in Dekker’s writings or in Defoe’s Moll Flanders: prison is here typically conceived as a transitional area through which the condemned pass on their way to judgement and death – a space that prefigures the horrors of hell but is still determined by the social stratification of early modern England (the prison is depicted as a microcosm of society). It is here, though, that one can note a divergence from the more literal concept of liminality as employed by Victor Turner. The rites of passage which Turner describes are utterly different from the situation of his initiates either before or after their liminal experience. By contrast, the early modern prison as a mirror image of society, despite being a transitional site, reproduces the extra-carceral situation. At the same time, prisons described in terms of death or hell prefigure or anticipate the other world in terms of similarity. One could even argue that the result of liminal practices differs significantly. Whereas, in Turner’s The Ritual Process, the aim of the
liminal rites is to bring about a rebirth of the subject, in the early modern prison scenario, as we have seen, transcendence comes into existence precisely through religious projection beyond the wall or through help received from outside. It is only in the reformative orthodoxy of the penitentiary that the prisoner himself undergoes a crucial personal rebirth: s/he is put into an entirely artificial situation (the prison) that differs from the world before and after the carceral experience. The conceptual model of liminality therefore works better for the heterotopic penitentiary than it does for the old-style prison.

Literary prisons tend to literalize the metaphorical scenarios of liminality and figuralize the depiction of prison settings. The literary text iconically reproduces the interface between inside and outside, enclosure and restraint, corporality and spirituality in its own transcendence of the opposition between the literal and the figural. Carceral spatiality is a metaphorical site signifying physical liminality. In metaphorical terms, space always correlates with movement, with activity. It should therefore perhaps be noted that, for all the apparent passivity within which the prison subject finds him/herself confined, the traditional prison experience is typically one of embattled resistance – a resistance that consists in a fight against imposed inactivity (with its threat of inanimacy/entombment/death) and enforced corporality (the doubling of the prison in the materiality of the body). Even where the world has shrunk to the dimensions of one's body, carceral topography provides some lines of exit, if only on a metaphorical plane. Space, shrunk to the limits of the body, reconstitutes itself in spiritual expansion – like the fourth dimension, a resurrection on a different plane. Imprisonment then can be read as a liminal experience of initiation into the realm beyond bodily constriction, as an incorporation of the physical into the transcorporeality of a spatial dimension that has transcended the constraints of earthly embodiment.

In its application to carceral scenarios, the spatially determined concept of liminality therefore has to be complemented with an analysis of spatiality as such, of what I call carceral topography. This spatiality is significant in terms of its symbolic readings which relate to the corporality of imprisonment and to its transcendence. Confinement and flight have primarily physical manifestations; they receive a metaphorical reinterpretation when gaol breaking has become impossible and has been superseded by spiritual attempts at escape. Since liberation from the body is impossible except through death, a crossing of that line becomes an end-purpose rather than a transitional and liminal phase in the move towards the beyond. Carceral topography deals with the excesses and the destruction of corporality, with the metaphorical interrelation of physical outsides and insides and their spiritual and mental correlates. It provides a site on which issues of spatiality, liminality and difference are played out against the backdrop of the spiritual transcendence frame. That tradition of writing about the prison significantly ignores the community of prisoners and centres instead on the individual
and his or her subjectivity. It is perhaps for this reason that the topography of incarceration has practically disappeared from those chilling accounts of imprisonment that constitute the most prominent examples of twentieth-century prison literature — the experience of the Shoah or of Russian labour camps. Where the traditional dungeon scenario opposes bodies and walls, in these texts the walls are made of a sea of other bodies whose crushing impact on the prison subject no longer corresponds to a topography of insides and outsides. In the camp literature new metaphoric outlines of a camp topography can be discerned that revolve around the plurality and the engulfing corporeality of the many others. This corporeography (if it can be so called) thematizes the rampant animality of inmates thronging together; the sheer weight of numbers threatens to crush any residual traces of humanity in oneself or one's fellow inmates. More firmly still than in the "concrete womb" (Watterson 1996) of modern penal regimes, the material of camp existence is rooted in the experience of an even more thorough-going depersonalization, of a communal corporeality and abjection from which there is no longer even a metaphorical hope of escape beyond wall, window or door.48

0.4 Topology and Tropology: Some Definitions

When the term topos is used, one invariably thinks of the locus amoenus. Other familiar topoi include the poet's invocation to the muse or poetry's claim to make its subject immortal, to survive death (the immortality topos): compare Shakespeare's "So long as men can breathe or eyes can see, / So long lives this, and this gives life to thee" (xviii; 1997: 147) or Spenser's "my verse your vertues rare shall eternize, / and in the hevens wryte your glori- ous name, / Where whenas death shall all the world subdew, / our love s shall live, and later life renew" (Amoretti, lxv; 1989: 645). Another topos describes the poet's despair at the powers of death (the ubi sunt topos: "I had not thought death had undone so many" — T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land, I. 63; 1963: 65). Victor Brombert's 'happy prison' ("geôle en plein air"; Brombert 1975/1978; also known as the felix carcer) is an example relevant to our topic. In these instances the term topos relates to a situation or setting (the locus amoenus; the prison) or to an idea (the immortality topos) and corresponds to the lieu commun, the commonplace (Amossy 2002).

Despite this claustrophobic press of human numbers and the wretchedly overcrowded conditions, autobiographies and fictional renderings of camp literature have countered the threat of anonymity by an obsessive emphasis on individuals. This strategy of ethical resistance, as one might call it, is accompanied by the crucial importance of others within the power structure of the camp with its practices of oppression and solidarity. Subjective individuality having been depleted by the regime, ethical agency by individuals becomes central to one's survival.
However, in some cases the term *topos* is also used to refer to what would normally be considered a figure of thought, a *trope*. Thus, the image of the **STATE AS BODY**, in which the monarch corresponds to the head, the arms to the army and the stomach to the people, is often called a topos, although it is of course initially a metaphor. Likewise, the metaphors of the ship of state or the monarch as father (or mother in Queen Victoria's case) are often called *topoi*, and the same applies to the **prison amoureuse** (the prison of love), a recurrent trope in chivalric literature and Petrarchism (see Chapter 8 below). This relationship between topos and metaphor has received comparatively little attention in topological criticism, although Grosse (1995: 94) endorses Curtius's remark that topoi often have their origin in poetry, not merely in rhetoric (Curtius 1993: 92; 1953: 82). The original rhetorical concept of *topos* referred to a collection of argumentative elements that served as an inventory for lawyers and orators. Ernst Robert Curtius (1886-1956) significantly reconceptualized the concept by linking it with the poetic tradition. In his magnum opus, the 1948 study *European Literature and the Middle Ages*, Curtius devotes Chapter 5, "Topik" (1993: 89-115; 1953: 79-105), to a topology developed from ancient rhetoric, but he also includes a separate chapter on metaphors (1993: 138-54; 1953: 128-44). His examples of topoi are mixed.

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49 On some of these political images see Münkler (1994).

50 As Gerald Prince shows, the concept of *topos* has a long and involved history. To be specific, one can distinguish between two schools of thought. There are those critics who see topoi or topics as "(1) a method, (2) a grid of empty forms, (3) a reserve of filled forms" (Prince 1995: 127-8), as does Roland Barthes (1970: 206), and these scholars often focus on a form empty of meaning (Chaim Perelman 1977: 43-4). On the other hand, there are other critics who take topos to be semantically specific frames that share a similarity with motifs. Prince (1995: 128) here cites Curtius (1948), Frye (1957) and Todorov (1977). Prince emphasizes the conventionality of topos; he also argues that each topos must have at least two motifs (hence is to be distinguished from a maxim or proverb – 129), and that it is composed of textual or visual elements. Topoi are to be distinguished from mere themes, which do not occur in the same textual manifestation in different texts.

In a brilliant essay on topoi, Heinrich F. Plett additionally notes that topos have traditionally been part of the practice of literary memorialization. Topoi are concrete instances which are conceptually prestructured and pre-exist their use ("1. konkret, 2. (vor-)strukturiert und 3. (prä-)existent" – Plett 2000: 66); they are therefore 'classic' in the sense of ancient familiarity. As a consequence, the aesthetic pleasure induced by topos consists in the reader's recognition of the formula (67). Plett cannily notes that recognition and defamiliarization are two complementary aesthetic techniques that contribute equally to the reader's delight. He goes on to note four more features of topos, their (a) topicality – "thematischer ('topical') Bezug"; (b) poeticity, i.e. figuration in terms of prodigality (*copia*), variety (*varietas*), elegance of style (*elegantia*), wit (*acumen, ingenium*) and delight (*delectatio*); (c) their systematicity (in reference to the *dispositio*) and (d) their normativity or conventionality (Plett 67-9). At the end of his essay Plett draws a comparison between topos and simulation or display, and notes that topos can be analyzed from a generative or reception-oriented perspective (71-2). Display ultimately results not in mere imitation but in emulation (*aemulatio*), in a vying with earlier authors in the creative reinvention of a familiar topos (74). Plett therefore provides an admirable situating of topos within (neo-) classical aesthetics.

On Curtius's crucial role in the rise of topological studies and on his roots in Latinist and Hellenistic studies see Grosse (1995) and Goldman (1996). Grosse, summarizing work by Kopperschmidt (1973) and from the essays published in Jehn (1972), demonstrates that Curtius's understanding of the term *topos* differs from that of Aristotle and classical Antiquity but elaborates on some connotations present in Hellenism. See also the survey of research in Veit (1963). On the original Quintilian distinction between *figure* and *trope* see Erich Auerbach (1984: 25-7).
He discusses purely thematic topoi (e.g. the world upside-down – 1993: 104-8; 1953: 94-851), topoi that are metaphors (like the *theatrum mundi* topos – 1993: 148-51; 1953: 138-44), and metaphors which are only imperfect topoi, e.g. the use of body parts to characterize the mind as in the *forehead of his mind* (1993: 148-51; "corporal metaphors", 1953: 136-8).

In this book I am basing my terminology on Curtius, whose work has been a major inspiration. I therefore assume that there is an overlap between tropes and topoi. As a consequence, some metaphors will be referred to as *topoi* but also as *tropes*. Insofar as a topos is understood to refer to a 'figure of thought', it can legitimately be referred to as a trope, though the more setting-based topoi will be excluded from this label. We hence have the following overlap between concepts (terms):

![Figure 0.2 Relationship of Topoi, Tropes and Metaphors](image)

- **a** ... non-metaphoric tropes which are not topoi (e.g. irony)
- **b** ... non-metaphoric tropes which are topoi (e.g. *puer senex*)
- **c** ... metaphorical topoi, e.g. the *theatrum mundi* topos
- **d** ... metaphors that are not topoi (e.g. *the winter of my discontent*)
- **e** ... topoi that are not tropes (and not metaphors), e.g. the *locus amoenus*, the world *upside-down*.

Metaphors (d) are one category of tropes (besides metonymy, irony, hyperbole, etc.), and some non-metaphorical tropes are topoi (like the oxymoron of the *senex amans*) or turn into topos (b). Hence we have tropes that are not metaphors (a), topos that are not tropes (e; the *locus amoenus*, for instance), and topos which are tropes (in the form of hyperboles, litotes, antitheses, for instance; b) but not metaphors. As examples of this last category one can

51 On that trope see the excellent piece by Kunzle (1977).
cite the topos of innumerability (there are too many to count or tell them all – an instance of hyperbole), or the narrator’s affected modesty (litotes; cp. Curtius 1993: 93-5; 1953: 83-9). The category that figures most prominently in this study is that of the metaphorical topos (c) as in the PRISON OF LOVE or WORLD AS PRISON tropes.

The best way to focus on a topos is to conceptualize it as a recurrent structural commonplace (topos of course means ‘place’; lieu commun in French), which may turn into a cliché (Jost 2007: 262)52. Interestingly, definitions of topoi traditionally exclude a reference to genre53 (the locus amoenus may occur in a bucolic text, but the pastoral is a genre and not a topos); nor do they usually refer to characters54 (the cruel tyrant or the virtuous naïf are considered stereotypes, but not topoi), though more plot-propelling types are often treated as topos (the senex amans). Thus, the motif of virtue in distress, which correlates with a plot of rescue, may be referred to as a topos. Non-metaphorical topoi are therefore of great narratological interest.55

Topoi moreover overlap to a great extent with concepts like image, symbol, allegory56, motif, cliché or formula. Veit (1963: 163) perhaps goes furthest in his attempt to provide a clarification and distinction between these aligned terms, and most explicitly distances himself from the identification of topos and cliché (1963: 144). Terminology becomes even more impenetrable when one includes a consideration of the notion of theme, since topoi have obvious thematic qualities – they articulate a particular argument or present the world in a specific manner. Even tropes (and topoi that are tropes) can be regarded as thematic since they posit a metaphorical equivalence that imputes certain qualities to the target domain. The ship of state topos, for instance, argues that everyone needs to cooperate and ascribes specific functions to individual groups of people within the community of the nation. Thus, the monarch corresponds to the captain of the ship and is responsible for the survival of the passengers (the people), while the crew (the government, the army, etc.) need to ensure the safe journey through troubled waters (war, hazardous political developments, etc.). I would like to suggest that the reason why tropes can acquire the status of topoi is that

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52 Amossy (2002: 19) defines the lieu commun as "thème consacré, idée figée confinée dans un répertoire et qui fait partie d’un arsenal d’arguments".
53 But see Plett (2000: 70-1).
54 An exception is the puer senex topos. (See Plett 2000: 65 and Curtius 1993: 108-15; 1953: 98-105.)
55 See also Prince (1995) on the disnarrated (that which is not narrated but exists in the textual world); Ryan (1987) on the reader’s projection of unrealised plot developments; and Fludernik (2010a) on stories implied in cartoons.
through frequent use they accrue thematic resonance and develop a tradition of pointed use. Both the SHIP OF STATE and the STATE AS BODY topoi, for instance, are notable for their political conservatism: they underscore a message of obedience to the monarch, teamwork among different social classes for the benefit of the community as a whole, and a clear condemnation of individual dissent and refusal to cooperate.

In this study, the focus will lie on the combination of (1) metaphors, (2) tropes that have become topoi through recurrent use, and (3) thematic topoi in prison-related literature (literature about prisons, literature by prisoners and texts that employ prison metaphors). It is precisely the conjunctions of the three types of tropes and topoi that establishes what I have called the carceral imaginary (compare section 0.6 below). Several scholars have seen the potential of tropes to provide a key to the cultural imaginary of a particular nationality, area or period (Weinrich 1963; Münkler 1994). Topoi and tropes often serve as the ideological footsoldiers in the cultural work of literary and, even more obviously, nonliterary discourses. In fact, metaphors are generally credited with playing a key role in the establishment and maintenance of ideology (Münkler 1994, Dirven et al. 2001a, 2001b, 2003; Musolff 2004; Goatly 2007).

0.5 Metaphorics: Metaphor Theory and the Carceral

O’RIORDAN: We’re all in prison together, Johnny, one way or another. I’m a prisoner in the dark, and we’re all prisoners of the body, aren’t we? And if we escape into the mind we find ourselves inside some thick-walled philosophy. And if we escape from life itself, there we are behind tall bars of eternity. It’s a terrible incarcerated existence! Still, so long as we can sing in our cages we shall be happy enough, I daresay, so why worry. (O’Conor 1959: 111)

In this section I briefly introduce those readers who are not familiar with current metaphor theory to a few basic conceptual and terminological developments since I. A. Richards. I will then, more narrowly, provide some specifics about prison metaphors.57

I. A. Richards (1936) famously distinguished between the tenor, vehicle and ground of a metaphor. In MY JOB IS A JAIL, the vehicle (secundum comparationis) is the jail, which is applied to the tenor, the job (primum comparationis). Both are said to share a common ground (tertium comparationis), in this case perhaps the subject’s feeling of being stuck in an unenviable occupation.

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57 For a more extensive discussion see Fludernik (2005b). For recent studies of metaphor see Kövecses (2002), Semino (2008), Fludernik (2010b, 2011) and Donoghue (2014).
Cognitive metaphor theory (Lakoff/Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff/Turner 1989) reconceptualized metaphor study in crucial ways. Rather than visualizing tenor and vehicle as two areas that share essential properties (Achilles AS A LION shares the property of courage with lions), cognitive metaphor theory looks at metaphor as a case of attribution and projection. The source domain LION (vehicle) is projected onto the target domain ACHILLES (tenor). In this model, one reads Achilles under the projected frame of lionhood, which allows a wider range of interpretative options – besides courage, this might include ferociousness, a fear-inducing aspect, a kingly mien, etc. In accordance with the so-called invariance hypothesis, only those features of lionhood are projected onto Achilles which allow for a semantically fruitful transfer: lionhood in Achilles does not usually invoke a life of hunting in the African savannah, the eating of gazelles or having prolonged naps after feeding. Depending on different contexts, metaphoric lionhood may foreground entirely different features: someone's hair may evoke a lion's mane; another person's way of grasping something remind one of a lion's paw; a third person's stentorian voice evoke a lion's roar; and someone's facial features may seem like a lion's elongated muzzle.

A second important aspect of cognitive metaphor theory (CMT) concerns the status of metaphor in relation to thought. CMT arose from prototype theory, frame theory and cognitive studies (amply illustrated in Lakoff 1987). Its major insight is not the projection of source onto target domain per se but the cognitive process of categorization. It looks at metaphor as a re-categorization process – seeing the job as a jail; seeing the face of one's beloved as a sun. In the development of CMT, linguists have come to the conclusion that metaphors are not literary ornaments added to propositions for stylistic and aesthetic purposes, a stance that rhetoric had encouraged, but a way of thinking. Metaphor occurs in the mind and not merely in language. More interestingly still, metaphors recur in certain patterns that allow them to be analyzed as conceptual metaphors such as MARRIAGE IS A JOURNEY or ANGER IS HEAT. These conceptual metaphors then show up in numerous textual manifestations such as Our marriage capsized on the rocks of disagreement; We came to the end of

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58 I want to note here that the terminology of cognitive metaphor theory has been anticipated by the work of Harald Weinrich, the famous Romance scholar, whose essay on what he calls "bold metaphor" ("Die kühne Metapher", 'la métaphore vive' – Weinrich 1963: 325-44) already used the terms Bildspender ("image donor") and Bildempfänger ("image recipient") for source and target domains. See also Rolf (2005).

59 On the invariance hypothesis see Lakoff/Turner (1989) and Lakoff (1990). For a critique of the unidirectionality and target structure preservation claimed in the invariance principle which focuses on literary metaphor see Stockwell (1999).

60 CMT linguists indicate the cognitive or conceptual rather than merely linguistic quality of a metaphor by the use of small capitals. Metaphors given in small caps throughout this study therefore refer to the metaphor as a cognitive metaphor, whereas brief sentences citing the linguistic surface structure form (instantiations of cognitive metaphors) are given in italics. Double inverted commas, on the other hand, are used exclusively to signal verbatim quotations; single inverted commas give meanings of words or phrases, e.g. carceral 'of or relating to prison'.
our two months' pleasure trip and exchanged the yacht of honeymoon for the paddle boat of married life; or He blew his top. Recent advances in CMT have proceeded to categorize the various types of cognitive metaphors, their relationship with one another and their cultural and historical comparability (Kövecses 2002, 2005; Goatly 1997, 2007). Much newer work has also focused on the ideological implications of the metaphors we use (Lakoff 1987, 2006, 2009; Kövecses 2006; Goatly 2011). An important theoretical offshoot of CMT was the development of blending and conceptual integration theory (see below).

For literary scholars it is also important to note that cognitive metaphor theory has a much wider scope than traditional rhetorical metaphor studies. Whereas literary critics of the old school distinguish between metaphor proper, simile (comparison with like, as, etc.), metonymy (e.g. Downing Street has rejected the proposals) and synecdoche (pars pro toto: e.g. Sixty sails crossed the Channel), CMT conflates all of these figures as superficial variants of conceptual metaphors. Even metonymy, considered the opposite of metaphor in key theoretical texts such as Jakobson's aphasia essay (Jakobson 1956) or David Lodge's Modes of Modern Writing (1977), has in the meantime become a subcategory of the basic source to target projection process; the only difference being that in metonymy the source domain comes from within the same frame as the target domain. In I love my Shakespeare, the reference to the bard is part of the frame of reading a book by an author, and the language, personality or oeuvre of Shakespeare the author are all part of this same frame.61

The most important recent development in cognitive metaphor theory is linked to the theory of blending, initiated by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (Fauconnier 1994; Fauconnier/Turner 1998, 1999, 2002, 2008; Turner 2002, 2008). Blending reconceptualizes cognitive metaphor from a one-directional projection to a more complex fusion between different 'worlds' in which as a result of the merger the implied analogies lead to the production of new meanings.62 Put most simply, blending theory, at least for double-scope blends,63

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61 The term frame is here used in the meaning of a static cognitive model (in contradistinction to a script, which involves typical stages of a process) as institutionalized by frame theory (Schank/Abelson 1977). On metonymy and its relation to metaphor see Gossens (1995), Kövecses/Radden (1998), Panther/Radden (1999), Barcelona (2000), Panther/Thornburg (2003), Fludernik (2005a) and Denroche (2014). Superb literary treatments of metonymy can be found in the essays of Style's special issue on metonymy (Steen 2005a).

62 Analogy is an important concept in traditional metaphor study, see for instance Coenen (2002, 2011). Although not all analogies are metaphorical, many are. The two examples provided in the German Wikipedia entry on analogy, for instance, are both metaphorical: Gleichheit ist die Seele der Freundschaft ("Equality is the soul of friendship") and Viele Köche verderben den Brei ("Many cooks spoil the broth"). While the first sentence is a metaphor in itself, the second becomes one when applied to, say, current German university politics, where the introduction of B.A. programmes has been fairly uncoordinated, with the result that the so-called Bologna Process has turned out to be a disastrous mess.

63 On single and double-scope blends see Fauconnier/Turner (2002). In a single-scope blend there is a clear direction of the transfer — the metaphor ACHILLES IS A LION ascribes lion-like features to Achilles, but not Achilles-like aspects to the lion. Double-scope blends construct a scenario in which both input spaces contribute to the meaning in mutually reflective manner. One of Fauconnier/Turner's examples is if
eliminates the invariance hypothesis (cp. Fludernik 2010c) and introduces a so-called gener-
ic space which reflects the common coordinates of the two input spaces (formerly source and target domains). In the blend, the fourth space, source and target are superimposed one upon the other. (See Figure 0.2 below). In the most recent developments, the emphasis is no longer on conceptual metaphors but on conceptual integration networks (Turner 2008).

In MY JOB IS A JAIL (cp. Glucksberg/Keysar 1990; Gibbs 1999), a single-scope blend, the associations with incarceration invoke the workplace as a location to which one is tied and in which, possibly, one is under the control of a warder-like boss who is experienced as abusive, unreasonable or strict and pedantic. A cartoon of this metaphor in action might foreground the worker's office as a tiny dark room with barred windows and add the boss in the posture of a shouting slave driver, or it might show the employee seated at his desk or standing at his machine in the factory with his ankle chained to a cannonball or attached to the desk or machine. Visual narratives (a cartoon of this type could be regarded as a kernel narrative) have a great range of techniques for producing metaphors, frequently also by means of verbal messages in the caption. The blend of this metaphor highlights the fact that the employee is confined to the workplace (chained to it) or subjected to the dictates of an abusive employer, who makes him/her work by coercion (in a cartoon version perhaps figured by a boss wielding a whip). Which of the two readings of MY JOB IS A JAIL will be dom-
inant (as primarily confinement or also as control, abuse, or slave labour) depends on the context or on people's individual associations with their own work experience or with imprison-
ment. Given suitable contexts or individual inclination (loneliness, boredom, frustration), other associations might be developed. One possible visualization of a blend for MY JOB IS A JAIL could be Figure 0.3 as given below.

Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg would sink (2002: 221). The link to counterfactuality and the fic-
tional is patent (Birke et al. 2011).

Having briefly presented the move from traditional rhetoric (comparandum = tenor, comparatum = vehicle, tertium comparationis = ground) to cognitive metaphor theory's opposition of source and target domains and on to blending and conceptual integration theory, I wish to note that my main interest in this book is in textual analysis and not in theory or categorization. My discussions of metaphors will never become too dense for non-linguists unfamiliar with the finer points of cognitive metaphor theory to follow. I will, however, employ the small caps notation for conceptual metaphors throughout since my main argument is, precisely, the prototypical nature of the tropes that I am analyzing.

Let me now turn to an outline of the workings of prison metaphors. Prison metaphors abound in everyday language. Here are a few examples picked at random:

1. The novels which haunt me are those that give the effect of a journey continuing beyond the end of the book: Isabel Archer going back to her prison at the end of *The Portrait of a Lady*; the lovers walking away into the crowd in *Little Dorrit* and disappearing into everyday humanity; [...] (Lee 2007: 33)
(2) In a coded rebuff to the indecision of his old boss Gordon Brown, the former climate change secretary promised: "We will not be imprisoned by the focus groups. Politics has to be about leadership, or it is nothing". (Wintour 2010)

(3) Historically, the novel was an expression of our disillusionment with the existing certainties of state and religion. Tragic drama shakes the bars of our confinement, but once the hero is vanquished the old limitations are restored, and the glimpse we briefly enjoyed of a world built to accommodate our ambitions and desires has faded before we have even left the theatre. (Jacobson 2010)

(4) [...] remember that in the final choice a soldier's pack is not so heavy a burden as a prisoner's chains. (Dwight Eisenhower; cited Charteris-Black 2004: 142)

(5) Then when this kindly world all round the man has been blackened out like a lie; [...]. The stars will be only dots in the blackness of his own brain; his mother's face will be only a sketch from his own insane pencil on the walls of his cell. But over his cell shall be written, with dreadful truth, 'He believes in himself.' (Orthodoxy; Chesterton 1909: 44)

(6) Simon Jenkins is, of course, right to say that regional arts infrastructure should be treated proportionately ("As they bow to London's arts mafiosi, the Tories still handcuff the provinces", 22 October). (Eakin et al. 2010)

These quotations demonstrate the ubiquity of prison imagery: it occurs in literature (5), in literary criticism (1, 3), in journalism (2), in arguments (4), political speeches (4) and of course in everyday conversations. Yet not all prison metaphors are the same. I would like to distinguish between two types of prison metaphors.65 On the one hand, there are metaphors in which the prison serves as target domain of the metaphor. I call this the PRISON IS X pattern. The second type of prison metaphor (X IS A PRISON) is that in which prison serves as a source domain. This pattern is the one we encountered in examples (1) to (5) above. In order to distinguish between the two types, I earlier (2005b) coined the term metaphorical prison for type two metaphors (X IS A PRISON); Carnochan refers to its tenor as an "epistemological prison" (1977: 7). However, since what people whom I talked to mostly associated with the term prison metaphor was precisely the X IS A PRISON category,66 I have meanwhile found it more useful to either explicitly note source or target domains, or simply to employ the PRISON IS X / X IS A PRISON formula.

65 The following text in this section is partly taken from Fludernik (2005a,b).
66 The problem seems to lie in the analogy of prison metaphor with animal metaphor, plant metaphor, machine metaphor. In all of these collocations, the modifier refers to the source domain.
A large variety of source domains are used to describe prisons. PRISON IS X metaphors, for example PRISON IS HELL, mostly occur in texts with prison settings or in texts that are concerned with prisons on a thematic level. The two most common, even hackneyed, source metaphors for imprisonment are the identification of prisons with hell and with live burial, coffins or tombs:

I have spent 21 years in continuous incarceration. I am 40 years old. I have no desire to foresee hell in any other form; for I have already discovered it. This is a literal 'hell-hole'. It is a LIVING HELL. If the fires do not consume me, I hope to someday be free [...] (qtd. Arriens 1991: 61; original emphasis)67

Another very common association, especially in early modern and eighteenth-century texts, is that of prison with society at large: PRISON IS (like the) WORLD / (or like) SOCIETY. This comparison mostly comes in the shape of similes (Fludernik 2003) and relies on the typical early modern social stratification of prison, in which one encountered a cross-section of the population with their different trades, social standing and pecuniary status. (See my discussion of William Fennor's The Counter's Commonwealth, 1617, in section 1.2 below.) More modern types of prison, by contrast, are frequently characterized in terms of their anonymity, lack of humanity and coldness. In a key study on women's prison experience in France, Simon Buffard (1973) has coined the term le froid pénitentiaire ('penitentiary chilliness'), and Kathryn Watterson's famous book on women in U.S. prisons is entitled The Concrete Womb (1996) – a metaphor that combines the idea of live burial, coldness and anonymity. Watterson cites a prison inmate whose husband died and who was not even allowed to phone her family to find out what had happened: "Frances herself called it "a good example of the coldness here"" (Watterson 111).

With Watterson we are in the realm of images that are quite specific and no longer generally used. In the Renaissance, even more peculiar source domains came to be employed in the characterization of prisons; prisons were not only compared to ships, but also to dicing houses and even universities (see 1.2). On the other hand, there also exist source domains used in the delineation of the prison experience that focus on the beneficial or valuable quality of confinement. Sometimes they do so in straightforwardly positive terms, and sometimes they emphasize that prison constitutes a corruption of an inherently valuable essence. For instance, in a famous Dickens passage from chapter 32 of Great Expectations,
Wemmick takes Pip to Newgate and presents the criminals as flowers which the gallows is going to pluck in full bloom:

It struck me that Wemmick walked among the prisoners, much as a gardener might walk among his plants. This was first put into my head by his seeing a shoot that had come up in the night, and saying, "What, Captain Tom? Are you there? Ah, indeed!" and also, "Is that Black Bill behind the cistern? Why I didn't look for you these two months; how do you find yourself?" Equally in his stopping at the bars and attending to various whisperers – always singly – Wemmick with his post-office in an immovable state, looked at them while in conference, as if he were taking particular notice of the advance they had made, since last observed, towards coming out in full blow at their trial. (Dickens 1996: 246)

Both flowers and executed youth will be 'nipped in the bud', or (if released) wither into insignificance (for Jaggers's law firm). Watterson uses this metaphor to accuse prison personnel of indifference and incompetence: "Life in prison is a garden of dross, cultivated by those who never check to see what their crop is" (Watterson xxi). She foregrounds the criminal neglect of prisoners on the part of society that has failed to bring these plants to full bloom and is dodging its duties as a gardener.68

An unironically positive prison image is that of the hospital: "A jail ought to be a moral hospital where the offender is kept till he is cured" (Theodore Parker, "Sermon on the Dangerous Classes", cited in Jarvis 2004: 39). As Victor Brombert (1978) has demonstrated so forcefully, Romantic literature frequently presents prisons as places of refuge, safety, and even freedom. The womb/tomb equivalence may connote live burial, but also safety from intrusion as well as a state of meditation and creativity (Byrd 1977, Baur 2007, Perrottet 2011). Brombert's examples are culled from nineteenth-century French literature, with Stendhal's Charterhouse of Parma (1839) a prime instance, but the topos can be found also in English Romantic poetry and specifically in a metapoetic context.69

Among these metaphors, the PRISON AS WORLD trope (see Fludernik 2003) stands out since its source domain refers to the world or society as a whole, not to a specific comparable area within it (hell; garden) or to an abstract concept (coldness, anonymity) that constitutes one of the major features of imprisonment. The world (or society) is a very diffuse enti-

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68 Jean Genet's opening metaphor of The Thief's Journal, in which he compares convicts to flowers (1965: 5), on the other hand, fails to clarify what it is that makes the analogy compelling, unless it be a resonance with les fleurs du mal.

69 See, for instance, William Wordsworth's "Nuns Fret Not at their Convent's Narrow Room" (Wordsworth 1936: 199) or the anonymous "I love to be 'cribbed, cabined and confined' / Within the sonnet's fourteen lines of space" (Russell 1898: 74). Compare 10.3 below.
ty, and it is usually some aspect of society at large (e.g. social stratification) that is being projected on the prison world. The specificity of the metaphor therefore relies on metonymic concretization. (For a more extensive discussion of these issues see Chapter 1.)

The second major category of prison metaphors are metaphors in which prison serves as the source domain and is projected on a variety of target domains such as:

- LIFE IS A PRISON
- LOVE IS BONDAGE
- MARRIAGE IS A PRISON
- PATRIARCHY IS A PRISON
- UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION/PREDICAMENT IS A PRISON
  e.g. RACISM/APARTHEID/HOMOPHOBIA IS A PRISON
  MY JOB IS A JAIL

Many metaphors see particular spaces or institutions as imprisoning (HOME IS PRISON; OFFICE IS PRISON; HELL/PURGATORY IS PRISON – Geltner 2008: 89; SCHOOL IS PRISON). Metaphorical prisons can refer to very general situations as well as to quite specific circumstances that are experienced as confining. All of the examples given at the beginning of this section are of the \textit{X IS (A) PRISON} type. Thus, in (1), we have an instance of the MARRIAGE IS PRISON metaphor (Isabel Archer goes back to "prison"); in (4) being a soldier is compared with being a prisoner; and in (5) the mind is presented as a prison. (For more examples and discussion see 10.2.3 and passim.) The \textit{X is (a) PRISON} pattern can thus be found in an extremely wide range of applications from the more familiar to the idiosyncratic and absurd.

The most general \textit{X IS (A) PRISON} metaphor is that of THE WORLD IS A PRISON – a topos of Christian theological thinking about life as a vale of tears. The WORLD AS PRISON image neatly condenses typical features of the medieval and early modern system of incarceration with religious ideas about the soul's imprisonment in the body and the transitoriness of human existence in this world before eventual liberation into heaven (or condemnation and banishment into hell)\footnote{See also Lakoff/Turner, \textit{More Than Cool Reason}, for the LIFE IS BONDAGE and DEATH IS DELIVERY metaphors (23-4).}: "We are all shut up in the prison of this world under sentence of death. In this prison none escapes death. [...] And then, while we are still in love with the prison as if it were no prison, we are escorted out of it, one way or another, by death" ("On the Vanity of this Life"; More 1984: 167-9).\footnote{See Chapter 1 for an extensive discussion.}
Another very common topos occurring widely in medieval through Romantic poetry is that of the formula LOVE IS BONDAGE, in which (usually) the male lover is said to be a prisoner or slave of his beloved. From the trite:

Lord Froth: 'Twas so my heart was made a captive at first, and ever since 't has been in love with happy slavery. (The Double Dealer II, i; Congreve 141)

to the ironic,

With a terrible prescience which a multitude of impressions during her stay at Tran-some Court had contributed to form, she [Esther] saw herself in a silken bondage that arrested all motive, and was nothing better than a well-cushioned despair. (Felix Holt III, xlix; Eliot 1988: 389)

this topos displays a peculiar ambivalence towards the love relationship since it figures male wooing in terms of subjection and powerlessness. (On the prison amoureuse trope and figu-ral servitude see Chapter 8.) More specific still, and also quite common, is the MARRIAGE IS A PRISON metaphor, which is a recurrent trope for the experience of constraint and dependency on the part of both men (see 4.4) and women (see 4.5 and Chapter 9). One can distinguish between instances of the MARRIAGE IS A PRISON metaphor that focus on mere confinement, as in many male uses of the trope (She's my ball and chain), and more specifically feminist uses exposing patriarchy as in Doris Lessing's "To Room 19" (see 4.5.2). The analogy between the social situation of women and imprisonment has been drawn repeatedly both by women writers (Mary Wollstonecraft, George Eliot, Elizabeth Gaskell, Kate Chopin, Susan Glaspell) and by literary critics (see esp. Gilbert/Gubar 1984 and Nina Auerbach 1985).

Besides marriage and patriarchy, a host of other unacceptable situations or predicaments likewise attract a description in terms of prison metaphors. In James Weldon John-son's Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man (1912), the narrator of this first-person fictional memoir experiences American racism and the segregation of African-Americans as impris-oning and demeaning: "My situation made me feel weak and powerless, like a man trying with his bare hands to break the iron bars of his prison cell" (Johnson 98). The narrator has been trying to tell his white girlfriend, whom he wants to marry, that he has black blood, is merely 'passing' for white. Prison metaphors are employed also in reference to homophobia and to a variety of exploitative situations.

Among more idiosyncratic prison metaphors of this type one can mention that of COUNTRY LIFE IS A PRISON / LIVE BURIAL, a trope common in Restoration comedy, where Lon-
don is perceived to be the hub of the world.\textsuperscript{72} In the Hatton correspondence, women are said to "look upon a return to the country as being \textit{thrown into a gaol} or the \textit{being buried alive}" (Bishop of Oxford to Lady Hatton, 27 May 1680; E. Thompson 1878: I 227). The passage illustrates yet again the basic ambivalence of the carceral source domain. Seclusion, if self-imposed, can be an idyllic situation of refuge, peace and creativity (the country estate as Brombert's happy prison), but if the door is shut on you, or somebody wants to confine you, the same space becomes a trap and is experienced as threatening and alienating.

Let me recapitulate. There are two types of prison metaphors. The first type (\textit{PRISON IS X}) tells us something about how prisons are seen in our culture; the second (\textit{X IS A PRISON}) focuses on projecting such understandings on a variety of situations, some commonly felt to be confining, others more originally presented as such by individual writers. This book discusses both types of prison metaphor, although the prison as source domain will be more prominent in my analyses.

The \textit{X IS A PRISON} formula often gives rise to characteristic topoi and indeed serves as the basis for a number of chiastic chapter titles in this book. In these, source and target domains occur in cross-configuration: the \textit{PRISON AS WORLD} and the \textit{WORLD AS PRISON} (\textit{Chapter 1}); the \textit{PRISON AS HOME} and the \textit{HOME AS PRISON} (\textit{Chapter 4}); the \textit{FACTORY AS PRISON} and the \textit{PRISON AS FACTORY} (\textit{Chapter 7}). It should be noted that such constellations do not necessarily falsify the invariance hypothesis of Lakoff (1993; for a summary see Kövecses 2002: 102-4). In the \textit{FACTORY AS PRISON}, the factory is seen as confining and prison-like; this metaphor is qualitatively very different from the \textit{PRISON AS FACTORY}, where factory-related qualities are attributed to prisons. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that metaphor domains when joined together do often evoke such a reciprocal projection, and that this is not only the case with prison metaphors. For instance, in many fairytales the werewolf is both a man turned beast and a beast turned man. One could also transpose source and target domains to yield \textit{TIME IS MONEY} and \textit{MONEY IS TIME}. However, this cross-projection does not work with every metaphor. Thus, in the \textit{PRISON OF LOVE} trope, love is figured as bondage, but prisons are not describable as love-like since love's prototypically very positive associations cancel out application to the clearly negatively connoted site of confinement and misery that is the prison. Except in deliberately paradoxical formulations like Wordsworth's "the child is father to the man" (1936: 460) – such inversions are counterintuitive. Moreover, tripartite metaphor clusters such as \textit{Death is the Mother of Beauty} (Turner 1987) or "Close bosom-

\textsuperscript{72} The opposite may be the case as in Joyce Cary's \textit{The Captive and the Free}, where for Clarry "to get back into the country was like an escape from a prison sentence" (1959: 238).
friend of the maturing sun" (Keats, "To Autumn") do not easily allow such reversals: "beauty is the daughter of death; *sun is the bosom-friend of autumn.

What makes metaphors of imprisonment (PRISON IS X) particularly worth analyzing is their explicit naming of the associations with carcerality current in our culture. By contrast, prison metaphors that employ prison as a source domain mostly focus on such stereotypical associations for a purpose, namely in order to characterize the negative, restrictive or otherwise confining qualities of an almost unlimited range of contexts. What will be particularly enlightening in the analyses that follow in this book is the conjunction of metaphors of both types, the interplay between topoi and metaphors, and the combination of prison metaphors and prison settings in a variety of texts. Another interesting perspective is afforded by the interrelation of metaphor and metonymy. Source terms for prison metaphors (X IS A PRISON) are often taken from the prison frame, using items associated with prisons such as typical modes of constraint or basic components of the cell. Thus, phrases like walled in, fettered or chained as well as synonyms of the prison itself such as cell, dungeon or hole are employed as source terms. In fact, one of the most important insights afforded by the distinction between X IS PRISON and PRISON IS X consists in the recognition of how metonymy interacts with metaphor (Fludernik 2005a). In PRISON IS X metaphors, feelings typically associated with imprisonment are invoked by means of metaphors; but with time these correlates of imprisonment often turn into metonyms that become cultural stereotypes. In the case of X IS A PRISON metaphors, by contrast, the source terms adopt metonymical components of the prison scenario. The function of metonymy in PRISON IS X metaphors is therefore one of cultural semantics, while in the X IS A PRISON tropes, metonymy operates by associative identification. As I will demonstrate in 5.2 and 10.2.4, these terms can be electronically searched in various corpora to yield more and wider-ranging metaphor data.

### 0.6 Ideology and Metaphor: The Carceral Imaginary

Because prison metaphors are recurrent and endure through the centuries, they convey an image of what people typically associate with prison spaces and confinement. These images allow one to piece together what I have called a carceral imaginary (Fludernik 2004, 2005b), an overall vision of what imprisonment 'means' in our culture. Such an imaginary arises both from people's beliefs about carcerality, which feed into texts by way of imagery and themes, and from readers' or viewers' reception of imagery and literary representations of the carceral, which again influence our conceptions and associations regarding prisons. What we are talking about here is therefore a circuit of mutual cross-fertilization between cultural imaginings and textual figurality. The point about the crucial influence of literature is that
information about prisons in the real world is scarce and needs to be sought out. Since people's views about prisons usually come from the books they read and the films they see, their knowledge is largely determined by these fictional media and by their preconceptions.

In recent decades, film has been more important than literature in forming our ideas of what prisons are like; despite this, many traditional and quite anachronistic images are still in use. When a woman talks about her lover and says "Felt to me [...] like [...] a ball and chain" (see the song "Ball and Chain", Janis Joplin 1967), such a phrase harks back to pre-twentieth-century penal policy (chaining convicts to cannonballs) and does not reflect contemporary practices of incarceration. Fetters and dungeons continue to abound as source terms in contemporary texts' metaphors, although the dungeon as a space of incarceration has ceased to exist. Other source terms like cell and bars, which reflect the reality of American penal institutions as predominantly depicted in prison movies, have noticeably increased and thus echo the prevailing prison realities.

The model envisaged here is therefore one of mutual cross-influencing: changes in historical reality (for instance, in penal policy or the construction of prisons) impinge on metaphors; at the same time, metaphors and traditional images purveyed in texts, and nowadays in films, influence people's attitudes and opinions and therefore ultimately affect politics. Hence, the carceral imaginary is a site of ideology.

Ideology as a concept carries notoriously conflicting meanings and connotations. Eagleton lists sixteen different current meanings of ideology, of which I here quote the most relevant:

(a) the process of production of meanings, signs and values in social life;
(b) a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class;
(c) ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power; [...] 
(f) that which offers a position for a subject;
(g) forms of thought motivated by social interests; [...] 
(i) socially necessary illusion;
(j) the conjuncture of discourse and power; [...] 
(o) the indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relations to a social structure (Eagleton 2007: 1-2)

73 In a search of the The Guardian (UK) online for the year 2010, only thirteen metaphorical uses of dungeon were found and seven of fettered/fetters, whereas prison yielded 62 items and shackled/shackles as many as 109 instances.
74 The lexeme cell in reference to prisons only became widely used in the nineteenth century.
75 For excellent introductions to the subject of ideology see Žižek (1994) and Eagleton (2007).
Most conceptions of ideology are negative (ibid.: 3), and they are usually applied to the beliefs of others; one finds it easier to see the mote in other people’s eyes than the beam in one’s own (Hawkes 2003: 13). Historically, the term ideology was coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1796 (appropriately, while he was in prison during the Terror) and then acquired its basic still pertinent sense in Napoleon’s label for the idéologues, his liberal and radical critics, whom he portrayed as holding a contemptible political world view (Head 1980; J.B. Thompson 1984: 1; Mannheim 1985: 54-4). The ideologues were a group of Enlightenment scholars who criticized the influence of superstitious religion on people’s rationality (Eagleton 2007: 64-8; Head 1980: 261-2). Although critical of religion, the ideologues originally used the term ideology to characterize their own idealistic stance, not the negative opinions of others. Since these original formulations, the concept of ideology has moved from the meaning of a ‘false consciousness’ to characterizing “the social practices which constitute people’s lives” (Dollimore 1984: 9, in reference to John Mepham); it therefore is equivalent to “the very terms in which we perceive the world” (ibid.). Foucault, in his turn, eschews the term ideology, preferring to focus on how “truth-effects are produced inside discourses which are not in themselves either true or false” (1979b: 36).

In the Marxist framework, ideology characterizes the dominant attitudes of the ruling class, which are imparted through the media of the superstructure and which reflect the base’s economic materiality (Marx/Engels 1845-6). Self-interest and hegemony in the Gramscian meaning therefore play an important role in the generation of ideologies (Lukács 1971: 52-3). In Georgy Lukács’ formulation, one can analyze ideology as the projection of class consciousness on people’s world view. Ideology does not merely provide a ‘mask’ or camouflage for society’s material and economic basis. With the advent of capitalism, a society was created that had a "purely economic articulation" and allowed for the emergence of class consciousness as a perceptible alignment (1971: 58-9). In the more recent theories of Louis Althusser, the individual, due to the imaginary nature of ideology, is presented as interacting with ideology through the process of interpellation (Althusser 1970). Althusser’s characterization of ideology takes account of the subject’s active complicitness with ideological stances and of his or her internalization of societal dictates, ideals and norms. He also emphasizes the existence of ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) such as the religious, educational, legal, political, cultural and communicational ISAs (1994: 110-11). These ideological state apparatuses are sites of negotiation and confrontation; in their multiplicity, they reflect the contradictions which express the clashes between capitalism and the proletariat in their class struggles (114). ISAs function through ideology (rather than force, as do the repressive state

76 Marx/Engels also discuss the history of the term ideology (1985: 39-41).
apparatuses, to which courts and prisons naturally belong) by means of the dispositif of a consciousness holding particular beliefs such as Duty or Justice or God (126). Althusser thus echoes Gramsci’s seeming contradiction that (“organic”) ideologies are both “necessary” and serve to “cement[...]” hegemony (see M. Barrett 1994: 236, 239-40).

The connections between discourse, power and ideology have been drawn in various ways (Dollimore 1984: 10). What is particularly important for most studies in ideology is the emphasis on ideas that belong to a particular, usually dominant or “hegemonic” (Gramsci) group within society and which help to legitimate the power structure from which this group is profiting (meanings (b), (c) and (g) in Eagleton’s list). For instance, the Victorian ideology of thrift and deference to the upper classes inculcated in the labouring poor can be exposed as a self-serving strategy that disguises the benefits which those with money derive from the working classes’ practising of these ideals: the poor work hard and require no charity and do not rebel against the injustice of their low wages and terrible living conditions. Eagleton illustrates how power is legitimated by teaching seemingly moral or religious ideals of behaviour, which are then naturalized as ‘given’ or ordained by divine fiat. He also notes how these ideologies are defended by a series of political moves or strategies: the denigration of ideas that challenge the dominant beliefs, the exclusion of rival systems of thought (e.g. socialism in the given example) and the obscuring of social reality (for which the Marxist term dissimulation or mystification can be used). Such a model is convincing in the treatment of ideologies that can be linked to hegemonic groups. For a situation in which several world views are in competition with one another, a more flexible model, particularly one that includes a notion of interpellation, may be more adequate, for instance Žižek’s canny psychoanalytic extension of Marxism which characterizes the operatives of ideology in terms of méconnaissance, symptom displacement and fetishism (Žižek 1989, ch. 1).

Although the present study will not adopt a narrowly Lukácsian or Althusserian model, its understanding of ideology echoes the mechanics described by Lukács and Althusser. For me, as for Karl Mannheim, ideology "stands for thought understood as determined by social conditions" (Minogue 1985: 38). What I am most interested in, however, is the cultural grounding of this process and its openness to negotiation and reinscription, undermining and subversion. In fact, the understanding of ideology as employed in this study closely resembles the concept of cultural work as used in cultural studies. According to Tompkins, "literary texts are conceived as agents of cultural formation" (1985: xvii). In her reading of


79 Minogue himself, in contrast to Mannheim, sees ideology as an "oppressive system" (1985: 37-8).
Cooper, the plot in *The Last of the Mohicans* functions to impose an ideology of white supremacy (the good Indian dies, the bad Indian is killed – 1985: 110-11). Similarly, Susan Warner’s *The Wide, Wide World* (1850) serves as an example of how the domestic novel teaches women to bear their entrapment in domesticity with good grace by accepting an ideal of religiously motivated self-abnegation (173-8). Metaphors, I will argue, perform cultural work to the extent that they explain one thing in terms of another. They thus reconceptualize our understanding of the target domain by imposing on it the associations derived from the source domain. The cultural work performed by metaphors may consist in playing down the negative aspects of an action as when the Romans used the word *pacification* to refer to their wars against rebellious tribes. The economic metaphors current in university politics today present learning and education as consumer goods which can simply be bought, rather than as treasures to be laboriously dug from the ground or as skills to be acquired through extensive practice. (As an acquaintance once noted, the ruling metaphor for universities should be that of fitness studios and not supermarkets: while the customer in a shop pays money in exchange for goods, the client of a fitness studio merely buys the right to use the training machines; their eventual benefit will depend entirely on the time and effort invested by him/her.) The ideological implications of metaphors have received much recent attention.80 In many political, social and literary contexts, metaphors perform cultural work by acting on the readers’ feelings and manipulating their subconscious attitudes and beliefs. As Teun van Dijk explains, the deployment of Us vs. Them arguments (“ideological polarization”) joined to a “positive self-representation by moral superiority” and combined with the use of hyperbole (demonizing the Other) are common ploys in ideologically inflected discourses (all 2008: 233).

As we will see, representations of prisons and confinement perform a wide range of cultural work. Such work may be in support of a dominant ideology of just punishment, but it may also subversively criticize current trends in punitivity. As Lauterbach (2004, 2005) has noted, many prison memoirs (and, one can add, a great number of prison films – see Alber 2007) – combine practical criticism of penal institutions with an implicit endorsement of criminal policy. They employ an innocent white middle-class protagonist as a focalizer or narrator, who shares the audience’s attitudes and thus attracts the reader’s/viewer’s sympathy, but display no compassion for the plight of the ‘real criminals’ (lower-class, often coloured inmates), against whom the hero positions himself in the story. Narratives like these therefore corroborate the audience’s prejudices against the criminal other; at the same time, their

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80 See Münkler (1994); Musolff (2003, 2004); Coulson (2001); Charteris-Black (2004); Chilton (2004); Lakoff (2006, 2009); Dirven et al. (2007). Note also the superb study by Kress/Trew (1978), which focuses on word order and vocabulary and their influence on ideology.
authors successfully plead for exceptions to the general rule or try to lobby for the abolition of a particularly humiliating or cruel practice which is current in jails. Such bi-directionality invokes Greenblatt’s famous containment thesis (1992): dominant ideology wins out over attempts at subversion, which are already neutralized within their very discourse. Ultimately, the gentlemen memoirs of the 1890s and 1900s (Lauterbach 2004, 2005) did not change the public’s punitive attitude towards convicts.

On the other hand, as an example from Clifford Geertz teaches, metaphors are able to articulate a critical stance against dominant political policies. Geertz uses the Taft-Hartley Act (passed in 1947 to curtail activities of labour unions) to show how its labelling as the "slave labor law" simplified the complex political situation; the slogan suggested that the Act intended to reduce "the American worker to the status of a slave" (1964: 58). According to Geertz, there is an explicit connection between the metaphoricity of the label and its usefulness as (counter)ideology:

That it might in fact draw its power from its capacity to grasp, formulate, and communicate social realities that elude the tempered language of science, that it may mediate more complex meanings than its literal reading suggests, is not even considered [by the sociologist]. "Slave act" may be, after all, not a label but a trope. (58)

As Geertz notes, the rise of this metaphor was particularly attuned to the political moment: the American working class was threatened by the "eclipse of New Deal liberalism" (59), which "set the sociopsychological stage [...] for the appearance of the 'slave labor' figure" (59). Instead of debating whether such a metaphor is or is not 'true', Geertz maintains that "[o]ne must simply frame the argument – that the Taft-Hartley Act is a mortal threat to organized labor – in some other way" (60). Geertz, in contrast to ideological analyses that foreground concepts like distortion, draws attention to the "expressive power and the rhetorical force of the final symbol" (60) and uses this case study as a plea for the analysis of "symbolic action" (60). We will encounter a similar constellation in Chapter 7 below, in which the use of slave imagery was more successful than in the Taft-Hartley context. Geertz’s insightful essay moreover points to the strong emotional and psychological thrust of ideology, an aspect clearly relevant to literary texts. In fact, Eagleton in his discussion of Freud not only notes that ideology is interwoven with fantasy, but that the "fundamental mechanisms of the psychical life are the structural devices of ideology as well. Projection, displacement, sublimation, condensation, repression, idealization, substitution, rationalization, disavowal: all of these are at work in the text of ideology, as much as in dream and fantasy [...]" (2007: 185). By thus bringing in desire and the dynamics of repression and camouflage (cp. Žižek 1989),
Eagleton all but spells out the recognition of ideology's fundamentally emotional appeal. How else could ideology interpellate its subjects? In analogy with these insights into the operation of ideology in general, the carceral imaginary which is the subject in this study can likewise be characterized as an emotional and psychological site of fantasy on which strategies of displacement and disavowal interact.

Interestingly, to anticipate one of the results of this study, the carceral imaginary unequivocally foregrounds the horrors of imprisonment. Except in the rare – and clearly paradoxical – figure of the happy prison (Brombert 1975; see the title of György Faludy's *My Happy Days in Hell*, 1962), prisons are predominantly perceived as humiliating, dangerous and frightening, though they may also provide protection from a hostile world outside.\(^{81}\) What is strikingly absent in the corpus of metaphors is any justice-related perspective. There are no metaphorical collocations like PRISON IS JUSTICE or JUSTICE IS CONFINEMENT. The justice-related aspects of texts are predominantly handled by plot and dialogue. The noted emphasis on the horrors of imprisonment is, moreover, ambivalent in ideological terms: it may evoke sympathy for the incarcerated and thereby offer a critical perspective on the penal system, but it also underlines the consequences of criminal behaviour and therefore fulfils the entirely conservative function of deterrence: the more terrible the world of the prison, the more careful readers or viewers will be to avoid the risk of going there. Foucault himself has pointed out that literature focuses on the two figures of the rebel (or hero) and the victim, two literary clichés (1979b: 45) that tend to present prisoners in a uniformly sympathetic light, thus practising what Keen calls "ambassadorial" or "broadcast strategic empathy" (2015: 356).

When texts do concentrate on a justice- or punishment-related argument, the plot predominantly focuses on the trial, and after its conclusion the criminal protagonists (usually the villains who are the hero's antagonist or minor figures) tend to be dropped into the off-stage location of the prison. The drama of justice plays itself out in the crime itself, in the detective's search for the responsible party and in the legal machinery of the trial; at the end, the culprit can be shunted off-screen and will be duly forgotten. The story of detection and condemnation moreover emphasizes the legality of the proceedings; such narratives tend to salve our consciences regarding the repressive quality of the legal and executive state apparatus. The tactic of disposing of the convicted felon by erasing him from the text or screen obviously mirrors the way in which confinement is relegated to the margins of society; it functions as a kind of black hole about which little is known and few care. At the same time, this relegation into the wings reflects society's disposition to repress questions about the ethics

\(^{81}\) See Siegelman (1990: 79-98) on the happy prison in psychotherapy.
of punishment. Whereas there was public concern about capital punishment in the nine-
teenth century, imprisonment does not raise similar concerns. 82 Once the inmates are safely 
stowed away, the memory of their fate becomes irksome and tends to be repressed. As 
soon as sentence has been passed, the culprit can be put into the limbo of carceral space 
and conveniently disposed of; crime has figured in the spectacle of public retribution and 
may now be forgotten. However, like all good Derridean supplements, the prison not only 
follows former inmates back into society; it also exerts an insidious fascination and influence 
on the world that has disavowed it. Like the return of the repressed, the re-emergence of the 
excluded off-location can be observed again and again in this study, for instance in 
Cholmondeley’s novel Prisoners (see 8.1.1). As we saw, in Foucault’s use of the figure of the 
panopticon, the disciplinary regime of the penitentiary emerges as a central factor of control 
in society at large; similarly, the carceral imaginary in the shape of metaphors imposes itself 
as a medium that reflects our anxieties, fantasies, desires and illicit urges. As Martha Dun-
can (1996) argues, the criminal, and thus also the heterotopic site of his residence, the pris-
on, symbolize our fixations on the forbidden and our moral condemnation of those who act 
out such unlawful fantasies. By censoring ourselves, we reject with loathing those who had 
no such qualms. The carceral imaginary, one can conclude, is therefore not only a site of 
ideology but also a playground of psychological projection.

Whereas Chapters 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 highlight the ideological work performed by the 
carceral imaginary, Chapters 2, 4, 8 and 9 focus on the psychology of metaphorics, though 
not to the exclusion of the ideological viewpoint. Neither aspect can be investigated without 
considering the political and the ethical angle. In the chapters that follow, all these strands 
will be braided together in my exploration of carceral tropes.

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82 Executions had to be transferred inside prisons since their cruelty, but also the delight they caused the 
lower classes, became too embarrassing for the bourgeoisie. For a depiction of the crowd's behaviour at 
executions see the report in The Times 27 May 1868 at the last public hanging (A. Barrett/Harrison 
1999: 307-10). Hangings were first transferred from Tyborn to outside Newgate Prison, and in 1868 the 
first private hanging inside Newgate took place. See Spiersenburg (1985) and Morris/Rothman (1995: 58-
61). In contrast to executions, against which there continues to be a vocal lobby, conditions of confine-
ment only reach the public's attention when the causes of riots are reported in the news.


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